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The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights: 
Separation of Ownership and Consumption 
abstract.  The nineteenth century saw the standardization and rapid spread of the modern 
business corporation around the world. Yet those early corporations differed from their contemporary 
counterparts in important ways. Most obviously, they commonly deviated from the one-share-one-
vote rule that is customary today, instead adopting restricted voting schemes that favored small over 
large shareholders. In recent years, both legal scholars and economists have sought to explain these 
schemes as a rough form of investor protection, shielding small shareholders from exploitation by 
controlling shareholders in an era when investor protection law was weak. 
 We argue, in contrast, that restricted voting rules generally served not to protect shareholders as 
investors, but to protect them as consumers. The firms adopting such rules were frequently local 
monopolies that provided vital infrastructural services such as transportation, banking, and insurance. 
The local merchants, farmers, and landholders who used these services were the firms’ principal 
shareholders. They commonly purchased shares not in the expectation of profit, but to finance 
collective goods. Restricted shareholder voting assured that control of the firms’ services would not fall 
into the hands of monopolists or competitors. In effect, the corporations had much the character of 
consumer cooperatives. This perspective also sheds light on the unusual importance given to the 
doctrine of ultra vires in the nineteenth century. 
 While current legal and economic scholarship has focused incessantly on the separation between 
ownership and control, the prior separation between ownership and consumption, accomplished by 
the late nineteenth century, was another fundamental but generally overlooked turning point in the 
history of the business corporation. Understanding this transformation throws light not just on 
historical practices, but also on contemporary debates over deviations from the rule of one-share-one-
vote. 
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Adam Smith, an early critic of business corporations, identified two 
principal shortcomings of that form of organization. The first was that 
corporations were commonly monopolies, to the disadvantage of their 
consumers.1 The second was what we would now label as agency costs.2 Today, 
the latter problem—the costs imposed by managers acting opportunistically 
toward shareholders, or by controlling shareholders acting opportunistically 
toward non-controlling shareholders—dominates discourse about corporate 
governance.3 Recently, scholarship in both economics and law has also come to 
view agency costs as the major element shaping the historical evolution of the 
corporate form, interpreting the peculiar features of corporate law and practice 
in earlier periods as means to protect small shareholders from exploitation by 
managers or controlling shareholders.4 This is particularly true of the 
nineteenth century—the era that established the principal forms of enterprise 
organization in their modern garb, including conspicuously, the business 
corporation.5 Some scholars have even suggested that corporate governance 
practices from the early nineteenth century might usefully be adopted today in 
developing economies that, like even the most advanced economies of the 
nineteenth century, lack strong legal institutions for shareholder protection.6 
This approach, however, is anachronistic. In the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, the main economic evil linked to the corporate form was 
not managerial or controlling-shareholder opportunism toward small 
shareholders, but rather Adam Smith’s first concern: monopoly. Prior to 1860, 
most corporate charters were granted by special acts of the state legislature, and 
 
1.  1 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 116-17 (P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776). 
2.  3 id. at 111-12. 
3.  See, e.g., John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 35 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter ANATOMY OF 
CORPORATE LAW]. 
4.  See infra notes 14-15. 
5.  After more than a century of relative stability, we are now in the midst of another period of 
rapid change in legal forms of enterprise organization. See Henry Hansmann, Reinier 
Kraakman & Richard Squire, The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 5 (describing the trend in new business forms as “extending strong entity 
shielding to unrestricted types of entities”). 
6.  See, e.g., ALDO MUSACCHIO, EXPERIMENTS IN FINANCIAL DEMOCRACY: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRAZIL, 1882-1950 (2009). 
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as a consequence often had a degree of monopoly power conferred on them.7 
More importantly, many corporations were natural monopolies due to 
economies of scale. The peculiar features of early corporate law and practice 
were frequently designed to minimize the abuse of that market power. They 
did not seek to protect the corporation’s shareholders as investors, as is 
conventionally assumed today, but rather to protect them as consumers. 
To understand this, it is important to recognize a critical but 
underappreciated feature of corporate enterprise in the early Republic—
namely, the lack of separation between ownership and consumption. In many 
corporations of the time, the principal shareholders were also the firm’s 
principal customers. These customers were the owners of businesses—farmers, 
merchants, and manufacturers. And the corporations were commonly 
providing infrastructural goods and services that were critical for the success of 
those local businesses. 
There were two reasons for this pattern of ownership. First, for many 
corporations, local merchants and farmers were apparently the most effective 
source of capital at a time when capital markets were poorly developed and 
governmental financing was not generally available. Second, by controlling 
their service providers, the consumers protected themselves from monopolistic 
exploitation. Early American business corporations were often, in effect, 
consumer cooperatives. And, as is generally the case with cooperatives,8 they 
served to protect their consumer-owners from the exercise of monopoly power. 
Appreciation of this ownership pattern illuminates important features of 
early business corporations that have recently attracted attention from scholars 
in both economics and law. Most prominent in this respect are the peculiar 
rules of shareholder voting in this era. In the late eighteenth century and much 
of the nineteenth century, U.S. corporations frequently had schemes of 
shareholder voting that deviated from the one-share-one-vote rule that 
subsequently became the norm.9 In particular, many nineteenth-century 
corporations restricted voting in ways that made it difficult for a single 
shareholder to obtain control of the firm. Such voting schemes were of three 
types: graduated voting, in which the number of votes exercisable by a single 
 
7.  As Justice Scalia has recently noted, “[m]ost of the Founders’ resentment towards 
corporations was directed at the state-granted monopoly privileges that individually 
chartered corporations enjoyed.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 387 
(2010) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
8.  HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 24-25, 122-25, 150 (2000). 
9.  There is, to be sure, deviation from that norm again today, for reasons not universally 
understood. These modern deviations are progressive rather than regressive. 
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shareholder increased less than proportionately with the number of shares 
owned; capped voting, in which a ceiling was imposed upon the total number of 
votes that a single shareholder could exercise regardless of the amount of stock 
he or she held; and per capita voting, which is the rule of one shareholder,  
one vote. 
These restricted voting rules first came clearly to the attention of legal 
scholars through the work of David Ratner10 and Colleen Dunlavy,11 both of 
whom documented the frequency of the phenomenon and offered a similar 
interpretation of it. That interpretation did not focus on economic factors such 
as agency costs and monopoly, but instead saw restricted corporate voting 
rights as driven by, as Dunlavy put it, a “social preference for particular types 
of governance.”12 In particular, they reflected a “social conception of the 
corporation” that was more “democratic” than the “plutocratic” approach to 
governance represented by the rule of one-share-one-vote.13 We will call this 
“the democracy theory.” 
Subsequently, the reasons for the restricted voting rules have been taken up 
by a number of other scholars, all of whom have—in contrast to Ratner and 
Dunlavy—emphasized explanations rooted in economic considerations. 
Specifically, reflecting the contemporary emphasis on agency costs, these 
authors almost uniformly interpret restricted voting rules as “designed to 
attract the participation of small shareholders by offering them some measure 
of protection from dominance by large shareholders.”14 Under this view, 
restricted voting—which was usually imposed by the corporation’s own 
individual charter—was “the most important protection offered to early-
 
10.  David L. Ratner, The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of 
“One Share, One Vote,” 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970). 
11.  Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation: Insights from the History of 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347 (2006). 
12.  Id. at 1354. 
13.  Id. at 1354-56 (suggesting that early Americans saw one-vote-per-share constructions as 
allowing shareholders to buy control of the company, a dangerous exercise of power); see 
also Colleen A. Dunlavy, Corporate Governance in Late 19th-Century Europe and the U.S.: The 
Case of Shareholder Voting Rights, in COMPARATIVE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 5, 12-13 (Klaus 
Hopt et al. eds., 1998) (attributing the “aversion to plutocratic voting rights” both to the 
prevailing view that shareholders were “members” of the corporation, rather than providers 
of capital, and to the characteristic American fear of concentrated power). 
14.  Eric Hilt, When Did Ownership Separate from Control? Corporate Governance in the Early 
Nineteenth Century, 68 J. ECON. HIST. 645, 660 (2008); see also MUSACCHIO, supra note 6 
(arguing that voting restrictions compensated for the weak institutional environment in 
early twentieth-century Brazil). 
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nineteenth-century small investors,” thus compensating for the weakness of 
the corporate law of the time in affording adequate minority shareholder 
rights.15 We will call this “the investor protection theory.” 
However, both the democracy theory and the investor protection theory 
have difficulty explaining two important elements of corporate voting patterns 
in the nineteenth century. First, why did restricted voting appear in certain 
industries—such as turnpikes, canals, railroads, banks, and insurance 
companies—while they were largely nonexistent in other industries, such as 
manufacturing? Second, why did restricted voting largely disappear from all 
types of corporations by roughly the end of the nineteenth century?16 
We seek to shed light on these questions by offering an alternative 
explanation for the observed pattern of restricted voting in the nineteenth 
century. Our interpretation is essentially economic in character, attributing 
changes in shareholder voting schemes to the different economic purposes and 
problems associated with business corporations in the early nineteenth century 
compared to their present-day counterparts. In short, we argue that voting 
 
15.  Hilt, supra note 14, at 648; see also Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Corporate Governance 
in Transitional Economies: Lessons from the Prewar Japanese Cotton Textile Industry, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 171, 199 (2000) (describing the adoption of similar voting restrictions by early 
nineteenth-century corporations in Japan and regarding these arrangements as minority 
protection devices against misbehavior by controlling shareholders); Aldo Musacchio, Laws 
Versus Contracts: Shareholder Protections and Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890-1950, 82 
BUS. HIST. REV. 445, 449 (2008) (describing the maximum voting provisions and graduated, 
regressive voting scales in Brazil as mechanisms to balance voting power across investors of 
different sizes); Robert E. Wright & Richard Sylla, Corporate Governance and 
Stockholder/Stakeholder Activism in the United States, 1790-1860: New Data and Perspectives, in 
ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY 231, 240 (Jonathan G.S. Koppell ed., 2011) (arguing 
that capped and graduated voting schemes in nineteenth-century U.S. corporations were 
“designed to mitigate agency problems between large and small shareholders”); Pedro 
Neves & Jaime Reis, Corporate Law vs. Company Charter: Shareholder Protection and 
Corporate Governance in Late Nineteenth Century Portugal (Aug. 2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with authors) (interpreting restricted voting provisions in Portuguese 
corporate charters as an investor protection device); Gonzalo Islas Rojas, Finance Without 
Law? An Analysis of Corporate Charters in a Laissez-Faire Environment (July 3, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-bin/conference/download.cgi 
?db_name=SECHI2009&paper_id=65 (finding that charters for Chilean corporations 
included provisions favorable to outside investors during a period when Chilean corporate 
law was silent on such matters). 
16.  Both of these questions are well documented but so far unexplained in the literature. See, 
e.g., Pauline Maier, The Revolutionary Origins of the American Corporation, 50 WM. & MARY Q. 
51, 78 (1993) (noting that voting “[r]estrictions were sometimes applied to certain types of 
corporations but not to others, or they might be abandoned in a process of change that has 
never been fully traced or explained”). 
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restrictions generally served as a consumer protection device in corporations 
that were, in a rough sense, consumer cooperatives. 
This “consumer protection theory” goes far to explain the relative incidence 
across different industries and firm ownership structures. Nineteenth-century 
transportation companies (turnpikes, canals, and railroads), as well as banks 
and insurance companies, commonly had substantial market power; 
manufacturing firms, by contrast, did not. Moreover, the firms adopting 
voting restrictions were typically local monopolies that provided vital ancillary 
services to local merchants. With surprising frequency, those merchants were 
at the same time the principal customers and the principal shareholders of early 
business corporations, for two important reasons. First, local merchants had an 
interest in helping form and finance an element of economic infrastructure that 
would be important to the success of their businesses.17 Second, this ownership 
pattern served to ensure that control over such an infrastructure element did 
not fall into the hands of profit-oriented investors who would charge the 
merchant monopoly prices for its use, or into the hands of one of the 
merchant’s competitors, who would use their control to discriminate in favor 
of their own businesses and against others in terms of the price, quantity, or 
quality of services provided. 
The consumer protection theory also helps explain why voting restrictions 
effectively disappeared from business corporations in the late nineteenth 
century. By then, local and state governments had taken on the primary 
responsibility for constructing and maintaining physical infrastructure such as 
roads and bridges. Railroads had become too long and capital intensive to be 
financed and controlled by essentially voluntary organizations, while capital 
markets developed to provide the necessary financing for private enterprise. 
Improvements in transportation and communication increased competition in 
banking and insurance, while governmental regulation made investor-owned 
firms increasingly viable. Exploitation of market power came to be managed by 
separate bodies of antitrust and rate regulation law rather than by corporate 
law. Separate statutes for cooperative corporations were adopted and used to 
organize, in a more viable form, the cooperatives that were employed in 
subsequent decades to deal with monopolies not well controlled by the state, as 
in agriculture. And restricted voting rules were easy to avoid over time, making 
them only a crude and temporary form of consumer protection, and one whose 
 
17.  See, e.g., ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN 
AMERICAN BUSINESS 28 (1977) (describing the creation of early U.S. corporations by 
merchants interested in obtaining “essential specialized ancillary services to support their 
profit-making commercial activities”). 
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costs—in terms of weak governance and limited access to capital markets—did 
not need to be borne after superior substitutes were developed. 
The consumer protection theory that we offer to explain nineteenth-
century voting restrictions is strongly at odds with the investor protection 
theory. When a firm is a monopoly, there is a clear conflict of interest between 
the firm’s investors and the firm’s customers. The investors benefit most by 
having the firm charge monopoly prices, while the customers are best served 
by having the firm charge competitive prices—or, in fact, even prices that do no 
more than cover marginal cost, so that the firm effectively provides no return at 
all to the shareholders’ investment. Consequently, if the firm is controlled by 
shareholders who are also major customers of the firm, the shareholders may 
prefer to keep the firm’s prices low, and get the return on their investment in 
the form of low prices rather than high dividends. But this policy will not be 
attractive to shareholders who are not also customers of the firm. From the 
perspective of an investor in the corporation, the customer-shareholders of the 
firm are tunneling out its (potential) profits through their other transactions 
with the company. 
In contrast to the substantial literature offering the investor protection 
theory of restricted voting rules, two authors, both writing in the legal 
literature, have suggested something analogous to the consumer protection 
theory. One is Donald Smythe, who, in a short but insightful comment on 
Dunlavy, proffers without further investigation the hypothesis that the 
restricted voting rules in corporations providing amenities such as bridges and 
turnpikes might be explained by their character as suppliers of local public 
goods.18 The other is Joseph Sommer, who, in a thoughtful article on the 
historical development of banking in the first decades of the American 
Republic, observes that the banks of that era frequently had the character of 
merchants’ “utilit[ies],” “clubs,” “credit union[s],” or “cooperatives.”19 
It is a familiar notion that the twentieth century brought the separation of 
ownership and control in large U.S. business corporations. Less familiar, but 
surely as fundamental, was the prior separation of ownership and consumption 
that characterized the evolution of corporations in the nineteenth century. 
Appreciation of this separation and its causes helps us understand the 
differentiation of the corporate form, in the course of the nineteenth century, 
 
18.  Donald J. Smythe, Shareholder Democracy and the Economic Purpose of the Corporation, 63 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1407, 1416-18 (2006). 
19.  Joseph H. Sommer, The Birth of the American Business Corporation: Of Banks, Corporate 
Governance, and Social Responsibility, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 1011, 1021, 1034-45 (2001). 
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into the various distinct types that governed enterprise organization for most 
of the twentieth century: the business (joint-stock) corporation, the 
cooperative corporation, the nonprofit corporation, and the municipal 
corporation. The early chartered corporations that we focus on here, with 
restricted voting rules, in effect combined elements of each of these latter 
forms: formal ownership by virtue of capital investment as in a joint stock 
company, de facto consumer ownership as in a cooperative corporation, 
philanthropic funding as in a nonprofit corporation, and provision of local 
collective goods and services as in a municipal corporation. 
After restricted voting gave way to one-share-one-vote, the latter rule 
dominated publicly held corporations in the United States for the following 
century, and in fact was a requirement for listing on the New York Stock 
Exchange from 1926 to 1985. In recent years, however, the consensus in favor 
of that rule in the United States has become frayed. Highly prominent firms, 
such as Google and Facebook, have adopted—via dual-class stock—voting 
allocations that are effectively the opposite of restricted voting, with 
substantially more votes per share allocated to the largest shareholders than to 
smaller shareholders—a pattern we might call “augmented voting.” If this 
trend continues, then shareholder voting rules in U.S. publicly-traded business 
corporations will have followed what appears to be a continuous shift, over two 
centuries, from restricted voting to pro rata voting to augmented voting. But 
there is no consensus on the reasons for the recent embrace of augmented 
voting—or on whether it will last or whether it might be beneficial for society 
in general.20 Moreover, a prominent proposal for a return to restricted voting 
 
20.  Most of the existing economic literature underscores the superior incentives generated by 
the one-share-one-vote rule. See, e.g., Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share-One Vote: 
The Empirical Evidence, 12 REV. FIN. 51, 52 (2008) (“The idea that the ‘one share-one vote’ 
principle is desirable is what might be considered the dominant view in the literature.”); 
Paul A. Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class 
Firms in the United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051 (2010) (finding an association between 
dual-class shares and lower firm value); see also Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, One Share-One 
Vote: The Theory, 12 REV. FIN. 1, 41 (2008) (describing the tradeoffs associated with the one-
share-one-vote rule, and concluding that “mandating one share-one vote may not improve 
overall efficiency”). For recent works defending the potential benefits of augmented voting, 
see Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Concentrated Ownership Revisited: The Idiosyncratic 
Value of Corporate Control (Columbia Univ. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper 
No. 444, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2228194, which interprets dual-class shares as a 
mechanism that allows entrepreneurs to retain uncontested control over the firm and, 
therefore, to pursue the idiosyncratic value related to their business ideas; and Ronald J. 
Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Private Benefits of Control (Yale Program for 
Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 461, July 1, 2013), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2182781, which argues that dual-class shares allow controlling 
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has recently been made, advocating in particular a system of “square-root 
voting” for publicly traded corporations, under which votes would increase as 
the square root of the number of shares that a shareholder owns in a 
corporation (so that, for example, one share would bring one vote, one 
hundred shares would bring ten votes, etc.).21 And investor protection is the 
principal objective of the proposal. 
We will not pursue these contemporary developments here. But, in seeking 
to understand the patterns of corporate control that might be appropriate in 
the twenty-first century, it is helpful to understand how and why other 
patterns developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
The remainder of this Article explores the potential of the consumer 
protection theory of restricted voting by examining more closely the economic 
properties of different voting schemes and the available data on shareholder 
voting rights in nineteenth-century corporations. Part I describes the schemes 
of shareholder voting rights adopted by U.S. corporations in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. We break down our analysis by 
industry and show that voting restrictions appeared with far greater frequency 
in firms that had market power and were owned by their principal customers. 
In Part II, we suggest that the consumer protection account sheds light on 
another feature of early corporation law for which conventional explanations 
seem unsatisfying: the doctrine of ultra vires. Part III then explores the reasons 
for the progressive abandonment of restricted voting schemes in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century. Part IV explores the potential of the consumer 
protection account to explain the foreign experience with restricted voting in 
early business corporations. 
i .   corporate ownership and voting rights in early u.s.  
history 
We begin by examining the ownership structure and voting patterns of 
U.S. business corporations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. 
For ease of exposition, we divide our analysis by industry sector, focusing first 
on corporations promoting physical infrastructure projects, second on financial 
firms, and finally on manufacturing corporations. 
 
shareholders to extract private benefits of control that compensate for their monitoring 
efforts. 
21.  Eric Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Quadratic Vote Buying as Efficient Corporate Governance, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2264245. 
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A.  Physical Infrastructure 
Today, much of society’s basic physical infrastructure, and particularly 
major elements of transportation networks such as roads and bridges, are 
financed—and commonly owned and operated—by one or another level of 
government. In the early decades of the American republic, however, the 
situation was quite different. Municipal corporations in the American colonies, 
like their English counterparts of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
were generally dominated by local tradesmen, and served largely to establish 
and protect the monopolistic guild-like powers of the various trades.22 
Municipalities sometimes constructed and operated facilities such as market 
halls and wharves, though apparently in large part for the sake of reinforcing 
the market power of the various trades and of the municipalities themselves, 
for which the facilities provided a source of income through user charges.23 
The American Revolution brought substantial democratization to local 
government,24 but, as we explain below, this did not result in broad expansion 
of local (or state or national) governmental provision of physical infrastructure. 
Not only was the historical precedent for much activity of this sort lacking, but 
so was the popular will. Strong suspicion of government and resistance to 
taxes—particularly conspicuous in the Jacksonian era—were accompanied by 
fierce regional rivalries that blocked agreement on governmental development 
projects.25 
 
22.  JON C. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORIGINS OF MODERN URBAN 
GOVERNMENT 1650-1825, at 16-34 (1975). 
23.  See id. at 28. 
24.  Id. at 64-78. 
25.  See, e.g., LOUIS HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT: PENNSYLVANIA, 
1776-1860, at 11-12, 42-43 (1948); see also GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR, THE TRANSPORTATION 
REVOLUTION, 1815-1860, at 98-99 (1951) (positing that regional rivalries accounted for the 
local nature of early railroads’ financing sources); Paul Chen, The Constitutional Politics of 
Roads and Canals: Inter-Branch Dialogue over Internal Improvements, 1800-1828, 28 WHITTIER 
L. REV. 625 (2006) (arguing that the failure to establish a coherent system of federally 
funded infrastructure during the early nineteenth century was due to the strong 
“constitutional scruples” of Republican Presidents during the period and the corruption of 
sectional influences within Congress); Smythe, supra note 18, at 1416 (attributing the lack of 
governmental funding of public improvements to prevailing fears of higher taxes). One 
example of such opposition came in 1816 when President Madison vetoed a federally funded 
internal improvements bill for state infrastructure, arguing that without amending the U.S. 
Constitution, Congress lacked the power to pass such a bill. See Pamela L. Baker, The 
Washington National Road Bill and the Struggle to Adopt a Federal System of Internal 
Improvement, 22 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 437, 442-43 (2002). 
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State governments of the early nineteenth century were, however, prepared 
to give corporate charters to groups of citizens who wished to finance and 
manage publicly beneficial improvement projects on their own. The result was 
the widespread resort to private organization and financing. And the internal 
governance structures given these corporations reflected their role as private 
producers of public goods. 
1.  Turnpikes 
Turnpikes provide a paradigmatic example of the use of voting restrictions 
in firms that were principally owned by their customers. In the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries, turnpikes were almost invariably undertaken by 
business corporations.26 Turnpikes were in fact one of the most common forms 
of business corporation throughout this period. Over one-fifth of all corporate 
charters granted in the late eighteenth century concerned turnpike companies, 
which remained one of the leading forms of business corporation in the East 
Coast through the early nineteenth century.27 Turnpikes made up one-third of 
all New York incorporations between 1800 and 1830.28 
Restricted voting schemes were particularly prevalent in turnpikes. Joseph 
Stancliffe Davis notes that voting caps were “well-nigh universal” in 
eighteenth-century turnpike companies.29 Other surveys of voting patterns in 
nineteenth-century business corporations find that turnpikes displayed the 
highest incidence of voting restrictions across all industries. In his study of 
early New York corporations, Eric Hilt finds that a striking 98% of turnpike 
charters included voting restrictions and only 1% of them specified a one-
share-one-vote scheme.30 Hilt estimates that turnpikes had a significantly 
 
26.  TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 24 (“The corporate form of organization appears to have been used 
for the turnpikes practically without exception.”). 
27.  RONALD E. SEAVOY, THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATION, 1784-1855, at 
39-40 (1982); TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 25 (“From 1815 to 1830 probably more charters were 
granted for this type of business than for any other.”). 
28.  Daniel B. Klein & John Majewski, Economy, Community, and Law: The Turnpike Movement in 
New York, 1797-1845, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 469, 470 (1992). 
29.  2 JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 
323 (1917). 
30.  Hilt, supra note 14, at 658 tbl.1. Hilt’s sample reflects the prevalence of turnpike companies 
in New York, as they make up 304 of the total sample of 812 business corporations. Id. New 
York’s general incorporation law for turnpikes of 1807 provided for one vote per share up to 
ten shares, and one additional vote per five shares beyond that. An Act Relative to Turnpike 
Companies, ch. 38, § 2, 1807 N.Y. Laws 50, 50. 
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lower level of voting concentration than corporations in other industries (a 
score of 0.23 in his index, compared to the next lowest score of 0.70 for bridge 
companies).31 Similarly, John W. Cadman reports that, even though the “vast 
majority” of early New Jersey corporations granted one vote per share, a 
significant number of turnpikes adopted either voting caps or a graduated 
voting scale.32 
To confirm and extend these statistics, and others we report below, we 
undertook our own analysis of a large database—assembled and generously 
made available to us by economic historians Richard Sylla and Robert 
Wright33—that contains the voting rules of nearly all (more than 22,000) 
business corporations that obtained a legislative charter in any of the states of 
the United States between 1790 and 1859. A more extensive description of that 
database, as well as tables with statistics we have derived from it, appears in the 
Appendix. To simplify interpretation, we focus only on corporations formed in 
the original thirteen states. Moreover, we exclude from our analysis the states 
of Massachusetts and South Carolina, for which there are indications that the 
original data contain systematic omissions or miscoding. This leaves us with a 
sample of 6,387 corporations. We will refer to our work with this sample as our 
“multistate analysis.” 
As shown in Table 1 in the Appendix, our multistate analysis reveals that 
65% of corporations undertaking turnpikes or plank roads (which we combine 
under the heading of “roads” in the tables) had restricted voting regimes over 
the period 1790-1859. Confirmation that this percentage is significantly higher 
than those for manufacturing is provided in Table 2, which contains the results 
of a regression analysis showing that, controlling for state and decade of 
incorporation, turnpikes and roads were significantly more likely to have a 
restricted voting rule than were manufacturing corporations. 
Consistent with the consumer protection account, turnpikes were the 
industry in which the interests of shareholders in the firm’s output (the road), 
rather than in the firm’s profits, were most conspicuous. Turnpike 
stockholders were commonly merchants and landowners who were located 
 
31.  Hilt, supra note 14, at 658 tbl.1. 
32.  JOHN W. CADMAN, JR., THE CORPORATION IN NEW JERSEY: BUSINESS AND POLITICS 1791-
1875, at 308-09 (1949). And although a higher proportion of bank charters than turnpike 
charters made use of graduated voting schemes, the reverse was true of voting caps. Id. 
33.  The dataset has been used in earlier work by Richard Sylla and Robert E. Wright. See 
Wright & Sylla, supra note 15; see also Robert E. Wright, Corporation Nation: Rise and 
Demise of the American Economic Juggernaut (2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
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along the path of the turnpike and would benefit from its presence.34 As put by 
Ronald Seavoy, “[t]urnpikes were popular investments, not necessarily 
because they were expected to be profitable, but because they improved access 
to markets, raised local land values, and lowered the costs of goods that had to 
be teamed in. Shares were of low par value and were widely held.”35 
In fact, turnpikes rarely paid dividends to their investors, and were not 
expected to.36 Purchasing a share resembled a voluntary payment of taxes 
toward a public good.37 Social pressure to contribute to this community 
improvement was an inducement to subscriptions, and the unlikely prospect of 
a financial return on the stock might have served as a form of “selective 
incentive[].”38 But the most effective marketing tool in attracting shareholders 
was the recurring emphasis on the expected financial benefits that the road 
would bestow upon them as local merchants and landowners.39 
 
34.  See TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 25. 
35.  SEAVOY, supra note 27, at 41; see also JOSEPH AUSTIN DURRENBERGER, TURNPIKES: A STUDY 
OF THE TOLL ROAD MOVEMENT IN THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES AND MARYLAND 104 (1931) 
(analyzing numerous turnpike shareholder lists and concluding that “subscribers were 
usually more interested in the possible benefits the new lines of communication would bring 
than in the profitableness of their investment”); Klein & Majewski, supra note 28, at 469 
(“Landowners, merchants, and farmers struggled to finance turnpikes, not so much in 
hopes of company dividends but in hopes of improved transportation, stimulated 
commerce, and higher land values.”). 
36.  See, e.g., Essex Tpk. Corp. v. Collins, 8 Mass. 292, 297 (1811) (“It is well known that in this 
country enterprises of this description have not been productive of profit to those who have 
engaged in them; nor is this generally a primary object of consideration with the 
subscribers.”); see also infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
37.  Daniel B. Klein, The Voluntary Provision of Public Goods? The Turnpike Companies of Early 
America, 28 ECON. INQUIRY 788 (1990). 
38.  Id. at 802-03 (stating that mechanisms of social pressure served as drivers of turnpike 
investments). 
39.  Id. at 804; see also Essex Tpk. Corp., 8 Mass. at 297 (“[T]he benefit contemplated to accrue 
individually to the new subscribers from this new direction of the turnpike formed another 
valuable consideration. . . . [The subscribers] are well aware that the community is 
benefited by them, and they agree to take a share of the burden.”); Klein & Majewski, supra 
note 28, at 501 (excerpting a newspaper article encouraging subscriptions for the New Paltz 
Turnpike that argues that the enterprise “can only be done by the stock being distributed 
very generally among the inhabitants of the village—each finding a motive to take a little, 
not from an expectation of its being productive (though it no doubt would pay something) 
but from an expectation that the investment would be returned with treble interest, in the 
addition which would be made to business and the value of property” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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That the principal interests of turnpike shareholders lay in the firm’s 
output, not in its profits, was apparent from the turnpike litigation in the early 
nineteenth century. Indeed, some courts went as far as to allow shareholders to 
renege on their subscription commitments if a subsequent alteration of the 
turnpike’s route made the road less useful to them as prospective users. For 
example, in Middlesex Turnpike Corp. v. Locke,40 a shareholder successfully 
defended an action for payment of assessments made after his subscription 
precisely because a later act of the legislature had altered the planned course of 
the turnpike road. Defendant’s counsel successfully argued that his client 
never consented to become a proprietor in the turnpike, as it was in fact 
located and made. He was induced to subscribe originally, on account 
of the particular convenience to him of the turnpike as originally 
directed. He would perceive no such convenience in the other route. He 
would have never subscribed to aid the latter . . . . 41 
The court agreed and let the shareholder off the hook.42 
Even the courts that refused to invalidate subscription obligations due to 
later changes of route understood full well the nature of the interests of 
turnpike shareholders in the enterprise. In Irvin v. Susquehanna & Phillipsburg 
Turnpike Co.,43 counsel for the aggrieved shareholder contended that “it was 
not at all contemplated that the profits of the road would compensate the 
individuals for their money subscribed; it was the facilities and benefits which 
would result to their property: and it was upon this consideration that Ir[v]in 
entered into the engagement to pay.”44 The Court agreed that while the 
indirect benefits to owners provided a “very powerful incitement” to turnpike 
subscriptions, it refused to equate “the motive for entering into the contract, 
with the consideration of it.”45 
 
40.  8 Mass. 267 (1811). 
41.  Id. at 270-71. 
42.  Id. at 271 (“The defendant may truly say, Non haec in foedera veni. He was not bound by the 
application of the directors to the legislature for the alteration of the course of the road, nor 
by the consent of the corporation thereto.”). 
43.  2 Pen. & W. 466 (Pa. 1831). 
44.  Id. at 469; see also id. at 470 (“That an expectation of benefit from a rise in the value of 
property near the route has been a powerful spring, in putting these incorporated bodies in 
motion, is not to be denied. Yet though reliance has been placed on the effect of it, the 
legislature has never encouraged it so far as to recognize it as a condition of the contract of 
subscription.”). 
45.  Id. at 470-71. 
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In this context, restricted voting helped ensure that nobody—and, in 
particular, nobody who was not a major user of the turnpike—would 
accumulate enough shares to give him or her both the interest and the 
authority to set the tolls at a price much higher than marginal cost, much less 
to monopoly pricing levels.46 It was evidently understood that economic 
development would advance most rapidly and most advantageously toward all 
adjacent merchants and landowners if tolls on the turnpikes were kept low. 
Toll prices were kept very low indeed (almost to the point of undermining the 
firms’ viability) and underwent little change under the period. It is telling that, 
despite the well-known lack of profitability, petitions to the legislature for toll 
increases seemed to be very rare.47 
The notion that voting restrictions favored the interests of consumers at the 
expense of investors was well understood at the time. This point is clear from 
the 1846 Report of the Revisors of the Civil Code of Virginia, a rare piece of 
evidence of legislative intent on the reasons for abandoning restricted voting 
schemes. This work noted that the financial interests of the state government 
as a shareholder in many public improvement corporations counseled in favor 
of the one-share-one-vote rule.48 The Revisors showed concern that excessively 
stringent voting restrictions were allowing shareholder-consumers to exercise 
disproportionate influence over corporate management so as to favor low 
 
46.  To be sure, toll prices were typically set by corporate charters and were subject to legislative 
scrutiny. Nevertheless, charter amendments were common, hence leaving open the 
possibility that a dominant shareholder with a financial interest in the firm would lobby the 
legislature for toll price increases. See Wright & Sylla, supra note 15, at 237 (describing the 
high frequency of charter amendments in the nineteenth century). 
47.  Klein & Majewski, supra note 28, at 499 (“To what extent companies even petitioned for 
[toll] increases we do not know, but it appears to have been little.”). Interestingly, the 
typical toll pricing structure seemed to privilege productive over leisurely transportation; by 
far the most expensive tolls rates applied to “pleasure carriages” (as opposed to the 
transportation of commercial and farm products). Id. at 484. Furthermore, English 
turnpikes in the same period were commonly constructed by nonprofit corporations rather 
than business corporations, with adjacent landowners and small investors purchasing bonds 
issued by the nonprofit corporation. Those bonds paid a reasonable rate of interest, and tolls 
were kept high enough to pay the interest. Thus, English turnpikes were effectively profit-
making ventures in nonprofit form, while the U.S. turnpikes were essentially nonprofit 
ventures in profit-making form. See, e.g., William Albert, The Turnpike Trusts, in 
TRANSPORT IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 31 (Derek H. Aldcroft & Michael J. Freeman 
eds., 1983) (on turnpike trusts in England); Dan Bogart, Did Turnpike Trusts Increase 
Transportation Investment in Eighteenth-Century England?, 65 J. ECON. HIST. 439 (2005) 
(same). 
48.  REPORT OF THE REVISORS OF THE CIVIL CODE OF VIRGINIA MADE TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
AT DECEMBER SESSION 1846, at 335 n.* (1847). 
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prices to the detriment of profitability. According to the Report, “[t]he private 
stockholder who has a large amount invested will be apt, when he gives his 
vote, to consider the effect of that vote upon his investment, and go for such a 
course as seems best calculated to make his stock productive . . .”; by contrast, 
“the man who has but one or two shares will often be either indifferent as to 
the measures that are adopted, or be less alive to the interest of a stockholder 
looking for dividends, than to the interest of one using the work, that the tolls should be 
low.”49 
2.  Bridges 
Voting restrictions were present in bridge companies incorporated in some 
states but not in others. Hilt finds that 42% of all bridge companies chartered 
in New York through 1825 adopted a restricted voting scheme.50 Voting 
restrictions also appeared in some early bridge companies in Massachusetts and 
in many bridge company charters in New Jersey.51 Conversely, bridge 
corporations chartered in Connecticut only rarely adopted restricted voting.52 
In our own multistate analysis, 38% of bridge corporations formed between 
1790 and 1859 had restricted voting. 
Two of the most important nineteenth-century cases involving business 
corporations concerned bridge companies: the landmark Supreme Court 
decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,53 which held that a corporate 
charter does not imply a grant of monopoly privileges, and Taylor v. Griswold,54 
the most cited case for the proposition that one-member, one-vote was the 
 
49.  Id. (emphasis added) (noting additionally that the large voting power of small shareholders 
and their considerations “foreign to the interests of the stockholders, as such” had often 
“conduced to the bad success which has attended so many of [Virginia’s] works of internal 
improvement”). The Report ultimately proposed the adoption of a more flexible graduated 
voting scale that gave far greater voice to large shareholders. Id. at 336 n.*. 
50.  Hilt, supra note 14, at 658 tbl.1. The 42% figure may be a slight underestimation, as Hilt 
reports no information on voting rules for 3% of bridge companies. Id. 
51.  CADMAN, supra note 32, at 309; EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 
UNTIL 1860 (WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MASSACHUSETTS) 243 (1954). 
52.  Alex Dreier, Shareholder Voting Rules in 19th Century American Corporations: Law, 
Economics and Ideology 22 tbl. (Apr. 24, 1995) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author) (showing that only one out of nineteen bridge companies chartered in Connecticut 
between 1789 and 1836 adopted a voting cap). 
53.  36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). 
54.  14 N.J.L. 222 (1834). 
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common law rule on shareholder voting rights in business corporations.55 
These influential decisions notwithstanding, bridge corporations have received 
far less scholarly attention than their counterparts in other industries. 
This dearth of historical studies translates into less information on the 
ownership patterns of early bridges and the driving forces behind their 
incorporation. Like turnpikes, bridges commonly have an important degree of 
monopoly power, which would naturally be expected to encourage consumer 
ownership. In describing the incorporation of Charles River Bridge, the first 
such company to be chartered in Massachusetts, Joseph Davis observes that 
“expectations of improvements in local business and in land values played a 
large part in the promotion, besides the prospects of revenue from tolls.”56 
However, by the time the Charles River Bridge case was decided (more than 
fifty years after the establishment of the company), the Supreme Court 
consistently referred to the interests of its shareholders as those of investors.57 
In Taylor v. Griswold, the question before the New Jersey Supreme Court 
was whether a bridge corporation could adopt bylaws permitting voting by 
proxy and providing for a one-share-one-vote rule in shareholder meetings 
when the company’s charter was silent on the issue. The court ruled in the 
negative, concluding that only the corporation’s charter, not the bylaws, could 
permit departures from the common law rule of one vote per member. In 
doing so, the court emphasized the “public nature” of corporations operating 
turnpikes, bridges, and railroads, as opposed to corporations it deemed to be 
“strictly private,” such as banks and insurance companies.58 Colleen Dunlavy 
pointed to the argument that “[e]very corporator, every individual member of 
a body politic, whether public or private, is, prima facie, entitled to equal 
rights”59 as paradigmatic of a different social conception of the corporation.60 
 
55.  But see Ratner, supra note 10, at 9 (arguing that “there is no real indication that any common 
law rule of one vote for each member of a business corporation ever existed” and 
highlighting that the Taylor court failed to cite any precedent on this issue). 
56.  2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 187. The charter of Charles River Bridge itself was silent as to 
shareholder voting rights, but bridges subsequently incorporated in Massachusetts usually 
adopted voting caps. 
57.  Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 470 (acknowledging that the chartering of Warren Bridge 
“has ruined the property of subsequent innocent stockholders [of Charles River Bridge], 
who have made their investments at a high price”). 
58.  Taylor v. Griswold, 14 N.J.L. 222, 234 (1834). 
59.  Id. at 237. 
60.  Dunlavy, supra note 11, at 1370-71. 
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Nonetheless, a closer reading of the Taylor opinion suggests that the 
adoption of restricted voting schemes in the nineteenth century was at least 
partially motivated by economic considerations. The New Jersey court’s 
decision, in particular, explicitly hints at a connection between voting 
restrictions and the interests of the consuming public in the face of a 
monopolistic firm. As put by Chief Justice Hornblower, 
the apparent tendency, of the by-law in question [adopting a one-
share-one-vote rule], is to encourage speculation and monopoly, to lessen 
the rights of the smaller stockholders, depreciate the value of their 
shares, and throw the whole property and government of the company, 
into the hands of a few capitalists; and it may be, to the utter neglect or 
disregard of the public convenience and interest. I do not say, that such 
was the design, or that such has been the effect; but only, that the 
natural or probable tendency of the by-law in question, is to produce 
such a result.61 
The Court reasoned that because bridges “partake more of a public nature 
. . . the public have a more direct and immediate interest in their management,” 
an objective that would be arguably best achieved by a one-member-one-vote 
rule—a voting scheme that gives primacy to the interests of consumers and the 
public vis-à-vis those of providers of capital.62 
3.  Canals 
The incidence of voting restrictions in canal corporations varied across time 
and place. Early canal charters in Massachusetts frequently provided for voting 
caps.63 Restricted voting schemes were also present in New Jersey canals, but 
were entirely absent from the corporate charters of the four canals incorporated 
in Connecticut through 1856.64 Our own multistate analysis indicates that 43% 
 
61.  Taylor, 14 N.J.L. at 241 (emphasis added and omitted). 
62.  Id. at 234. The Revisors of the Civil Code of Virginia expressly discussed the link between 
regressive voting rules and consumers’ interests. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying 
text; see also Ratner, supra note 10 (proposing the adoption of a one-shareholder, one-vote 
rule in order to implement a stakeholder-oriented model of corporate governance). 
63.  DODD, supra note 51, at 249-51. Some of these proposed canals, however, never came into 
being. 
64.  CADMAN, supra note 32, at 309; 2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 174 (giving three examples “of 
which charters were secured but upon which no work was done” in Massachusetts); Dreier, 
supra note 52, at 22-23. 
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of canal corporations formed between 1790 and 1859 had restricted voting, 
with a peak of 66% having restricted voting in the 1790s. 
The impetus behind the creation of the first canals in the United States was 
essentially the same as that for turnpikes. Local merchants and landowners 
whose business would benefit from improved means of transportation pooled 
resources and incorporated some of the early canals.65 Other eighteenth-
century canals, however, attracted foreign investments from the beginning.66 
The Middlesex Canal, one of the few early canals to be successfully 
constructed and operated, though unprofitable, provides an example of this 
type of locally owned and financed enterprise. Its founders were merchants, 
professional men, and landholders of Medford, the locality which, as the 
natural terminus of the canal, stood to benefit most from the new enterprise.67 
Christopher Roberts attributes the significant stability of the canal’s 
shareholder base in its early years to “the function of coöperating owners 
uniting to establish a public utility.”68 The Middlesex Canal’s original charter 
of 1793 contained an elaborate graduated voting scale, a scheme that was 
streamlined by a charter amendment two years later granting voting by shares 
subject to a limit of twenty-five votes per shareholder.69 In the Delaware and 
Raritan canal, a restricted voting scheme was apparently instituted as a 
defensive mechanism against foreign (i.e., out-of-state) control of the 
 
65.  See CHANDLER, supra note 17, at 35 (“The first canal lines were organized by merchants who 
needed the facilities to transport their goods. But they quickly came to be owned and 
operated by specialists.”). 
66.  2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 167-69 (noting that Dutch capital contributed to “the Proprietors 
of the Locks and Canals on Connecticut River,” chartered by Massachusetts in 1792, and 
London Capital financed most of the construction of a canal on the Connecticut River at 
Bellows Falls in Vermont, also chartered in 1792). 
67.  CHRISTOPHER ROBERTS, THE MIDDLESEX CANAL 1793-1860, at 28 (1938) (reporting that the 
leading citizens of Medford “were interested both directly as landowners and more 
indirectly as men of business attracted by the prospect of general prosperity”). 
68.  Id. at 45. 
69.  Id. at 41. The original charter provided that “[f]rom one hundred to three hundred dollars, 
inclusive, there shall be allowed one vote; from three hundred and one, to six hundred 
dollars, inclusive, shall be allowed one vote more; and for every thousand, above one 
thousand, shall be allowed one vote more, provided no one Proprietor shall have more than 
twenty votes.” An Act for Incorporating James Sullivan, and Others, by the Name and Stile 
of the Propriotors of the Middlesex Canal, ch. 21, 1793 Mass. Acts 325, 326 (emphasis 
omitted). 
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enterprise, again presumably to protect shareholders as customers at the 
expense of their interest as investors.70 
Ultimately, U.S. canals came to develop as government rather than private 
(either investor-owned or consumer-owned) enterprises, evidently for a variety 
of reasons.71 First, U.S. demographic patterns cut against private ownership of 
canals by investors.72 The most densely populated and commercially active 
areas in the United States were located either next to natural waterways or in 
the proximities of big East Coast centers that were accessible by roads, thus 
rendering canals uncompetitive.73 Second, private ownership by customers was 
surely impeded by the need for large amounts of capital, and by the 
heterogeneous group of merchants served by a long canal. Third, although the 
actors of the time would not have spoken in these terms, they presumably 
recognized that the high fixed costs and low variable cost of a canal required 
that, for efficiency, prices be set lower than the average cost, which required a 
substantial construction subsidy that was best injected through government 
ownership. Prior to the Erie Canal, only three of the existing canals in the 
country covered more than two miles; at twenty-eight miles in length, the 
Middlesex Canal was the longest of them, but struggled financially.74 In 
constructing and financing the trailblazing Erie Canal without the 
intermediation of the corporate form, the state government of New York 
inaugurated a new era of direct state involvement in canal development.75 
Those public projects, in turn, would soon be threatened by the rise of 
railroads. 
 
70.  See H. JEROME CRANMER, THE NEW JERSEY CANALS: STATE POLICY AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE, 
1820-1832, at 34, 144 (1978) (arguing that the adoption of a regressive voting rule in the 
Delaware and Raritan (granting one vote per share up to ten shares, and one vote per every 
five shares thereafter) was designed to prevent the corporation from falling under the 
control of New York or Pennsylvania). 
71.  E.g., 2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 185 (concluding that, with respect to eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century canals, “the corporate form, while necessary here, proved unequal to the 
task”). 
72.  For a discussion of the U.K. experience with canal companies, see infra Section IV.B. 
73.  DAVID R. MEYER, THE ROOTS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION 28 (2003). 
74.  Julius Rubin, Canal or Railroad? Imitation and Innovation in the Response to the Erie Canal in 
Philadelphia, Baltimore and Boston, TRANSACTIONS AM. PHIL. SOC’Y, Nov. 1961, at 5 (1961). 
75.  CHANDLER, supra note 17, at 34 (describing the insufficiency of private corporations to 
finance canal development). For a study on the role of the government in canal 
development, see CARTER GOODRICH, GOVERNMENT PROMOTION OF AMERICAN CANALS AND 
RAILROADS, 1800-1890 (1960). 
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4.  Railroads 
Railroads came to dominate long-distance transportation in the nineteenth 
century, but they appeared later than the turnpikes and canals that they 
eventually replaced. While turnpikes and canals had been chartered since the 
eighteenth century, the first railroad corporations date from the late 1820s.76 As 
was the case with many canals, some railroad corporations received substantial 
government backing, but most of the early New England railroads formed in 
the 1830s were wholly private enterprises.77 
Voting restrictions were common in the early stages of private railroad 
development. Massachusetts railroads established in the 1830s typically capped 
the voting power of large shareholders.78 A Massachusetts railroad statute of 
1836 restricted the voting rights of individual shareholders to one-tenth of the 
number of outstanding shares,79 a rule also followed by five of the first ten 
railroads incorporated in Connecticut.80 
Similar to turnpikes and canals, the formation of early railroad corporations 
was commonly animated by the prospect of indirect benefits stemming from 
improved means of communication. With minimal exceptions, domestic and 
foreign finance capital, which became important financing sources in later 
decades, did not play a major role in funding early railroad construction.81 As 
highlighted by Thelma Kistler, the first railroad promoters generally framed 
their appeals for subscriptions in terms of “incidental advantages” rather than 
profitability. Shareholders agreed to subscribe for the stock of the Western 
 
76.  See WINTHROP M. DANIELS, AMERICAN RAILROADS: FOUR PHASES OF THEIR HISTORY 3 
(1932) (tracing the development of U.S. railroads back to the 1830s). A few railroad 
companies, however, were launched before then, such as the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad 
of 1827 and the Mohawk and Hudson Railroad of 1826. See infra notes 95 & 100. 
77.  See STEPHEN SALSBURY, THE STATE, THE INVESTOR, AND THE RAILROAD: THE BOSTON & 
ALBANY, 1825-1867, at 80 (1967). 
78.  DODD, supra note 51, at 258-63. All of the first Massachusetts railroads chartered in 1830 
capped the number of votes per shareholder, even if one of them placed the rather lenient 
cap of “one-fourth of the whole number” of shares. Id. at 262. 
79.  Mass. Rev. Stat., ch. 39, § 50 (1836) (“[E]ach member shall . . . not be entitled to any vote 
for any shares beyond one tenth part of the number of shares of the stock of such 
corporation.”). 
80.  Dreier, supra note 52, at 27-28. 
81.  See DANIELS, supra note 76, at 8-10 (finding that much of the early capital required for 
railway construction was raised directly from contributions at home); TAYLOR, supra note 
25, at 98-100. 
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Railroad despite “a certainty of no direct profits.”82 Likewise, calls for 
contributions from residents along the route of the Amherst and Belchertown 
road stressed that subscriptions were not meant to be “an investment” for 
“financial return,” but rather “to secure the benefits for himself and 
community.”83 
However, restricted voting gradually fell into disuse as the industry 
matured in its first decades. All Connecticut railroads chartered after 1841 
granted one vote per share.84 New York’s general incorporation law for 
railroads of 1850 also specified a one-share-one-vote rule in director elections.85 
In our multistate analysis, the percentage of railroad charters with restricted 
voting dropped precipitously from 48% of those chartered in the 1820s to 6% 
of those chartered in the 1850s. Consistent with these figures, Colleen Dunlavy 
shows that in the 1840s, support for restricted voting was already rapidly 
losing traction even in railroad corporations that initially limited the voting 
rights of large shareholders.86 
We suggest that changes in voting rules parallel major transformations in 
the financing and ownership structure of railroad companies. Late nineteenth-
century railroads came to be seen as the paradigm of the modern, large-scale 
business corporation requiring massive amounts of capital, specialized 
management, and dispersed ownership. Railroad securities ultimately became 
the darlings of Wall Street and the object of the most high-profile corporate 
scandals and control contests of the nineteenth century.87 But this shouldn’t 
 
82.  Thelma M. Kistler, The Rise of Railroads in the Connecticut River Valley, 23 SMITH C. STUD. 
HIST. 1, 81 (1938). 
83.  Id. 
84.  Dreier, supra note 52, at 28. 
85.  An Act to Authorise the Formation of Railroad Corporations, and to Regulate the Same, ch. 
140, § 5, 1850 N.Y. Laws 211, 213. Even after the enactment of general incorporation laws for 
railroads, however, corporate promoters continued to seek special charters for additional 
privileges. See COLLEEN A. DUNLAVY, POLITICS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION: EARLY RAILROADS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND PRUSSIA 70 (1994). 
86.  Dunlavy, supra note 11, at 1383 (describing developments at the Western Railroad); see also 
Colleen A. Dunlavy, Corporate Democracy: Stockholder Voting Rights in Nineteenth-Century 
American and Prussian Railroad Corporations, in INSTITUTIONS IN THE TRANSPORT AND 
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRIES: STATE AND PRIVATE ACTORS IN THE MAKING OF 
INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS, 1850-1990, at 33, 47 (Lena Andersson-Skog & Olle Krantz eds., 
1999) (noting that by the mid-nineteenth century “graduated voting schemes—even a 
simple cap on total votes—seem generally to have fallen out of favor in the United States, 
except possibly in Massachusetts”). 
87.  DANIELS, supra note 76, at 25-27. 
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obscure the fact that many of the earliest U.S. railroads closely resembled the 
type of cooperative enterprise that characterized other early transportation 
companies. 
The geographical distribution of early railroad shareholdings corroborates 
the import of ancillary benefits as an inducement to stock subscriptions. The 
first railroad corporations in New England were eminently local businesses, 
covering an average distance of 36 miles as late as 1850.88 As many as 95% of 
Western Railroad’s Massachusetts shareholders (holding 96.6% of its total 
stock) resided along the route of the road.89 Most shareholders of the New 
London Railroad were also adjacent residents.90 All in all, the vast majority of 
early railroad promoters and shareholders were local merchants, 
manufacturers, or landowners who expected to benefit from the railroad’s 
operations.91 
The interests of shareholder-consumers help explain the use of voting 
restrictions in early railroad companies. A key driver behind the first railroad 
incorporations, in particular, was “the desire to deflect trade from a rival 
commercial town.”92 In this light, voting restrictions helped assure that the 
corporation would not easily come under the control of capitalists having 
interests antagonistic to those of the railroad and its beneficiaries—a 
consideration that seems to have carried real weight at the time. 
The experience of the Western Railroad, one of the first Massachusetts 
railroad companies, is illustrative of this concern. In 1834, when the Western 
faced great difficulty obtaining the requisite financing for construction, a group 
of New York capitalists offered to subscribe to the company’s entire capital in 
exchange for control of the business. Despite the firm’s urgent need for funds, 
its representative rebuffed the offer, pointing to the risk that the railroad would 
be “so managed as to defeat the purpose of its incorporators.”93 The voting 
 
88.  Id. at 4. 
89.  Kistler, supra note 82, at 84. 
90.  Id. at 85. 
91.  TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 97 (“As with the turnpike companies, many of the early railroads 
secured most of their private capital from merchants, small manufacturers, farmers, and 
professional men living along the proposed route of the new railroad.”). 
92.  DANIELS, supra note 76, at 4. 
93.  Kistler, supra note 82, at 84; see also TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 98-99 (noting that “New York 
competition was so feared that when badly needed funds for the Western Railroad were 
offered by New York capitalists, they were refused”). Two years later, the Western 
succeeded in obtaining public financial support; the new subscriptions by the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts made it a “one-third partner” in the enterprise and 
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restrictions specified in Western’s initial charter, which capped the voting 
rights of individual shareholders at one-tenth of the total shares,94 arguably 
fulfilled a similar function.95 
By contrast, the little Mohawk and Hudson Railroad chartered by the New 
York legislature in 1826 was one of the few early railroads to be entirely 
investor owned.96 The Mohawk, which sought to connect the cities of Albany 
and Schenectady, was the first New York railroad designed to draw passenger 
traffic.97 Unlike its contemporary counterparts, it was not a local enterprise, 
being primarily sponsored by New York City capitalists.98 In 1830, only two 
months after the beginning of construction, it became the first railroad to be 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange.99 Consistent with its investor 
ownership, the Mohawk adopted a one-share-one-vote rule from the outset.100 
The development of the railroad industry brought about changes in its 
financing and size. Once the first railroads were successfully constructed and 
turned out to be lucrative ventures, railroad promoters began to emphasize 
potential profit as well as indirect benefits when seeking new subscriptions.101 
The structure of early railroads as “local ventures designed to serve local 
 
entitled it to appoint three of its nine directors. See SALSBURY, supra note 77, at 143; Dunlavy, 
supra note 11, at 1376. 
94.  An Act to Establish the Western Railroad Corporation, ch. 116, § 10, 1833 Mass. Acts 660, 
666-67. 
95.  To be sure, not all merchant-backed railroads adopted voting restrictions. Merchants 
seeking to regain the trade that was being diverted through the Erie Canal promoted the 
creation of the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, chartered in 1827. This corporation, however, 
enjoyed substantial governmental support from its inception, with the state of Maryland 
and the city of Baltimore subscribing for one half of its total capital. See EDWARD 
HUNGERFORD, THE STORY OF THE BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD 1827-1927, at 27-28 (1928). 
Perhaps because of its concentrated government ownership and the infeasibility of a 
takeover, its charter adopted a one-share-one-vote rule. Id. 
96.  Cf. Frank W. Stevens, The Beginnings of the New York Central Railroad, N.Y. CENT. LINES 
MAG., Apr. 1926, at 21 (describing how the Mohawk & Hudson Railroad began to receive 
subscriptions for stockholding within six months of incorporation); see also DANIELS, supra 
note 76, at 15 (“[T]he Mohawk and Hudson was the first railroad to appear on the stock 
market.”). 
97.  EDWARD HAROLD MOTT, BETWEEN THE OCEAN AND THE LAKES: THE STORY OF ERIE 9 (New 
York, John S. Collins 1899). 
98.  See Stevens, supra note 96, at 17, 24. 
99.  DANIELS, supra note 76, at 13-14; Stevens, supra note 96, at 24-25. 
100.  An Act to Incorporate the Mohawk and Hudson Rail Road Company, ch. 253, § 4, 1826 N.Y. 
Laws 286, 287. 
101.  Kistler, supra note 82, at 92. 
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purposes” no longer seemed practical after 1847, and railroad expansion to 
more distant areas of the country became a priority.102 
As the scale of railroad operations expanded, so did their financing sources. 
As noted by Winthrop Daniels, in the infancy of the industry, railroads “were 
chiefly financed by the savings of the localities they traversed.”103 Railroads 
resorted to the issuance of bonds beginning in the 1850s; meanwhile, railroad 
securities were becoming popular in eastern financial centers, and were 
increasingly held by speculators or magnates seeking control of the 
enterprise.104 By 1905, it appeared clear that “Wall Street is built on railway 
securities.”105 
As the industry developed, and railroad ownership and control shifted 
away from local beneficiaries to investors, public dissatisfaction mounted over 
the railroads’ monopolistic pricing practices. Arthur Hadley’s classic study on 
railroad history viewed the separation between owners and customers as the 
source of discontent against railroad monopoly. “Serious conflicts of interests 
concerning a turnpike or bridge were almost impossible,” he argued, “because 
those who owned them and those who used them were to a large extent the 
same, or, at any rate, came in personal contact”; by contrast, “one set of men 
own a railroad and another set of men use it.”106 
B.  Financial Infrastructure 
Restricted voting was not confined to firms providing society’s physical 
infrastructure. It was also frequently employed by firms that provided the 
financial infrastructure for business activity. 
 
102.  Id. at 35-36. 
103.  DANIELS, supra note 76, at 9. 
104.  Id. at 16; see also TAYLOR, supra note 25, at 101 (stating that stocks “tended to gravitate into 
the hands of railroad magnates and promoters who used them for purposes of speculation 
and control”). 
105.  1 FRANK PARSONS, THE RAILWAYS, THE TRUSTS, AND THE PEOPLE 115 (C.F. Taylor ed., 1905). 
As late as 1906, railroad securities represented 85% of the bonds and 50% of the stocks 
traded on the New York Stock Exchange. See DANIELS, supra note 76, at 26. 
106.  ARTHUR T. HADLEY, RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAWS 21 (New York, 
G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1896). 
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1.  Banks 
Voting restrictions were also common in early U.S. banking firms. Merrick 
Dodd finds that voting caps were a “uniform practice” in Massachusetts banks 
in the early nineteenth century.107 According to Dreier’s study of nineteenth-
century Connecticut charters, banking corporations accounted for the highest 
incidence of voting restrictions across all industries, with precisely 50% of such 
firms specifying a graduated voting scale or, more often, an absolute cap on the 
number of votes per shareholder.108 Similarly, nearly one half of early New 
Jersey banks adopted a graduated voting scale.109 Voting restrictions were 
comparatively less frequent among New York banks. Hilt finds that 26% of 
New York banks in his sample adopted restricted voting, while 63% followed a 
one-share-one-vote rule.110 Our multistate analysis, in turn, shows 53% of 
banks adopting restricted voting between 1790 and 1859, with 82% doing so in 
the active decade from 1810 to 1820. 
Like other early business corporations, the impetus for the creation of the 
first banks often came from parties who were more interested in the bank’s 
services than in its profits.111 In the words of Robert Morris, the 
Superintendent of Finance who promoted the creation of the first chartered 
bank in the United States, the Bank of North America, the bank’s profit rate 
“would never be sufficient inducement to hold stock, if there were no other 
 
107.  DODD, supra note 51, at 215. 
108.  Dreier, supra note 52, at 24-25. Dreier’s study also reveals that caps on share ownership were 
widespread among early Connecticut banks as well. 
109.  CADMAN, supra note 32, at 308 (noting that this proportion included “nearly every bank 
charter passed before 1850”). 
110.  Hilt, supra note 14, at 658. In the period covered by Hilt (all incorporations through 1825), 
the chartering process in New York was particularly corrupt, with politicians expecting 
financial and political benefits in consideration for banking charters. A backlash against 
these corrupt practices led to the adoption of Free Banking in New York in 1838. See 
Howard Bodenhorn, Bank Chartering and Political Corruption in Antebellum New York: Free 
Banking as Reform, in CORRUPTION AND REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC 
HISTORY 231-44 (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia Goldin eds., 2006). 
111.  See, e.g., DODD, supra note 51, at 214 (“The eagerness to organize new banks was in many 
cases due more to the desire of prospective borrowers to create a bank from which they 
could obtain credit than to the desire of prospective investors to profit by means of 
dividends on bank shares.”); SEAVOY, supra note 27, at 53 (“Merchants organized the first 
state banks because they wanted to use the credit the banks created.”). 
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consideration”112 and the majority of its shares “belong to citizens of 
Philadelphia, and principally to the commercial men, whose greatest 
inducement to continue [as] stockholders, is to support an institution which 
affords them accommodation and convenience, by means of discounts.”113 
Local merchants were simultaneously the principal owners and the 
principal customers of most banks in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. In the words of a contemporary observer, “those who are not 
capitalists, but who are borrowers” were the main promoters of early 
Massachusetts banks.114 In their work on the history of New York’s Citibank, 
Harold Cleveland and Thomas Huertas noted that “like nearly all banks of the 
day,” the bank established in 1812 “was intended to be a kind of credit union 
for its merchant-owners.”115 
These banks typically financed the purchase and sale of merchandise at 
wholesale, and steered away from serving other types of potential customers.116 
In particular, banks provided much-needed liquidity for these merchants, who 
often had to advance credit at both ends of a given sale transaction.117 For 
example, merchants would pay sellers of merchandise with notes of obligation 
 
112.  DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF PENNSYLVANIA, ON THE 
MEMORIALS PRAYING A REPEAL OR SUSPENSION OF THE LAW ANNULLING THE CHARTER OF 
THE BANK 44 (Mathew Carey ed., Philadelphia, Carey & Co. Seddon & Pritchard 1786). 
113.  Id. at 95. For a detailed description of the commercial motives behind the later opposition to 
the Bank of North America, see Sommer, supra note 19, at 1034-37. 
114.  HENRY WILLIAMS, REMARKS ON BANKS AND BANKING; AND THE SKELETON OF A PROJECT FOR 
A NATIONAL BANK BY A CITIZEN OF BOSTON 17 (Boston, Torrey & Blair 1840) (noting that 
investor contributions made up only a modest proportion of the banks’ total capital). 
115.  HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND & THOMAS F. HUERTAS, CITIBANK 1812-1970, at 8 (Alfred D. 
Chandler, Jr. ed., 1985); see also Sommer, supra note 19, at 1028 (describing the early U.S. 
banks as “considered merchants’ utilities, chartered perhaps as public corporations, but 
operated as private credit clubs”). 
116.  See BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL 
WAR 75-76 (1957) (noting that “the first American bankers were merchants seeking to 
advance their own interests by an improved means of providing the credit they needed,” 
that “they lent as bankers the way they had lent as merchants,” and that “the earning assets 
acquired by banks were obligations arising from the sale and purchase of merchandise at 
wholesale”); cf. DODD, supra note 51, at 214 (“The eagerness to organize new banks was in 
many cases due more to the desire of prospective borrowers to create a bank from which 
they could obtain credit than to the desire of prospective investors to profit by means of 
dividends on bank shares.”). 
117.  Naomi R. Lamoreaux, The Structure of Early Banks in Southeastern New England: Some Social 
and Economic Implications, 13 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 171, 176 (1984) (“[W]hen these merchants 
borrowed money from the banks they controlled, they were to a great extent merely 
withdrawing their own funds.”). 
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rather than with piles of coin. The sellers could then take those notes to the 
local bank to “discount” them—which is to say, exchange the company’s notes 
for short-term credit in the bank, with the bank taking a small fee (discount) 
for the transaction. The bank might itself give sellers notes of obligation—
banknotes—issued by the bank, which these sellers, in turn, could hand over to 
other merchants as payment for consumption goods. Unlike modern 
commercial banks, which take deposits from the general public, early banks 
lent heavily out of their own capital stock. 
Competition appears to have been limited in late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century banking. Dreier reports, for example, that “[j]udging by 
the names of the banks and insurance companies chartered by special act in 
Connecticut between 1789 and 1856, which usually reflected where they were 
located, it was rare to find two banks, or two insurance companies insuring 
against the same risks, in the same town.”118 This initial shortage of bank 
charters was reinforced by state limitations on interstate and intrastate 
branching and by the legal restrictions on unincorporated banking in many 
states.119 While these legal restraints on bank competition were evidently in 
large part the product of ideology and political influence, early banks may also 
have enjoyed some monopoly power as a result of simple economies of scale. 
For example, prior to the establishment of a national currency in the 1860s, 
there were presumably important economies of scale in the issue of private 
banknotes. 
The combination of a limited supply of bank charters and price regulation 
via usury laws led banks to favor insiders in allocating funds.120 Merchants 
unaffiliated with banking institutions had difficulty obtaining credit. Hence 
there was a good reason for local merchants, who needed the bank to discount 
their notes, to control the bank (and, before they did that, to pitch in together 
 
118.  Dreier, supra note 52, at 49 n.119. 
119.  See, e.g., Richard Sylla, Early American Banking: The Significance of the Corporate Form, 14 
BUS. & ECON. HIST. 105, 111 (1985) (noting that “[u]nincorporated enterprises, glorified in 
most fields, were actually crusaded against in banking”). For a political economy account of 
branching restrictions, see Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, 
Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, 
and the European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 519-20 (2011). 
120.  See Efraim Benmelech & Tobias J. Moskowitz, The Political Economy of Financial Regulation: 
Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 12851, 2007), http://www.nber.org/papers/w12851 (finding that 
nineteenth-century usury laws allowed incumbents to deter entry and competition while 
decreasing their own cost of capital). 
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to finance its creation). That is, in this scenario, “[e]ach borrowing interest 
wanted a bank of its own.”121 
Moreover, banks of the time were highly risky enterprises and failed at a 
substantial rate. Among the reasons for failure was the presence of moral 
hazard. Investor-owned banks were subject to the temptation to speculate with 
their creditors’ money (e.g., money received in exchange for private 
banknotes)—a practice now controlled by public regulation of banks’ capital 
reserves. If the banks’ principal customers collectively owned the bank, 
however, they had an incentive to manage it conservatively so it would be less 
likely to fail (and especially to fail while owing them money). This is the same 
reason why consumer savings banks were organized exclusively as nonprofit or 
mutual firms before 1845, only slowly becoming investor-owned after that as 
states began to regulate the banks’ reserves.122 
Voting restrictions in consumer-owned banks helped prevent large 
shareholders from appropriating the banks’ credit to themselves to the 
detriment of other merchant owners. Yet the impetus for the adoption of 
voting restrictions in banks did not always come from the firm’s shareholders; 
it was sometimes externally imposed. The Bank of Massachusetts of 1784, one 
of the very first banks established in the United States,123 illustrates this point. 
Its charter mentioned the interests of merchants-consumers among the main 
justifications for the Bank’s creation.124 Many of the Bank’s initial shareholders 
were prospective customers, but its principal founder and stockholder, William 
Phillips, publicly displayed himself as a capitalist and a lender, not borrower, of 
the bank.125 The Bank’s initial charter provided for a one-share-one-vote 
rule.126 
 
121.  HAMMOND, supra note 116, at 147. 
122.  See HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 248-50. 
123.  Stuart Bruchey, Alexander Hamilton and the State Banks, 1789 to 1795, 27 WM. & MARY Q. 347, 
348 (1970). 
124.  The “Petition of William Phillips and Five Others for a Charter,” dated January 1784, argued 
that “it would prove beneficial to the Public in general & particularly to all Persons 
concerned in Trade to have a well regulated Bank established in this State.” N.S.B. GRAS, 
THE MASSACHUSETTS FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON 1784-1934, at 213 (1937). 
125.  Id. at 54 (noting that Phillips “borrowed only small sums from the Bank and indeed seems 
generally to have stood before the community as a lender or stockholder rather than as 
borrower”). 
126.  An Act to Establish a Bank in the State, and to Incorporate the Subscribers Thereto, ch. 2, 
1784 Mass. Acts 54, 56 (“[T]he number of votes to be determined by the number of shares 
each voter holds or represents.”). 
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When elected president of the Massachusetts Bank in 1786, Phillips forced 
its shareholder-borrowers to sell their shares and withdraw from the 
corporation, in a move which was arguably designed to steer the bank away 
from the type of debtor cooperative that was prevalent at the time.127 He also 
imposed limits on the amounts any shareholder or person could borrow, a rule 
which was, however, later abandoned.128 Yet the Bank’s monopoly profits, 
combined with a perception of insider favoritism and arbitrary discount 
refusals, continued to trigger resentment among disgruntled borrowers.129 
In order to appease critics and ensure “a more secure administration of the 
affairs of the Massachusetts Bank,”130 the state legislature eventually amended 
the bank’s corporate charter over its objections. Among the charter 
amendments, which ranged from prudential regulations to limitations on the 
bank’s scope of activity, the legislature imposed a cap of ten votes per 
shareholder—a rule that would persist as the norm for Massachusetts banks for 
nearly half a century.131 
In 1790, two years before this incident, Alexander Hamilton had famously 
defended the adoption of a restricted voting scheme in the First Bank of the 
United States—a rule that he viewed as a “prudent mean” between the more 
extreme alternatives of one vote per member and one vote per share. In his 
words, “[a] vote for each share renders a combination between a few principal 
stockholders, to monopolize the power and benefits of the bank, too easy,” 
 
127.  NAOMI R. LAMOREAUX, INSIDER LENDING: BANKS, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN INDUSTRIAL NEW ENGLAND 12 (1994); see also GRAS, supra note 124, at 53-54 
(noting that, through the stock repurchase, the Massachusetts Bank “seemed to be about to 
step down the primrose path of early banks in New England . . . owned by stockholders 
who were more interested in borrowing from the Bank than in loaning to it, more concerned 
with becoming fixed debtors than permanent creditors”). 
128.  See LAMOREAUX, supra note 127, at 12-13. 
129.  Id. at 13 (“The suspicion began to take root, both inside and outside the state legislature, 
that a handful of wealthy individuals had gained control of the bank and were using it for 
their own private purposes.”). 
130.  An Act in Addition to an Act, Entitled “An Act to Establish a Bank in this State, and to 
Incorporate the Subscribers Thereto,” ch. 48, 1792 Mass. Acts 188, 188. 
131.  2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 68-69 (explaining that “[t]his act (1) fixed a minimum 
denomination of $5 on notes issued; (2) made directors personally liable for payments of 
notes in case notes plus loans exceeded ‘double the amount of their capital stock in gold and 
silver, actually deposited in the Bank, and held to answer the demands against the same’; (3) 
required directors to furnish statements to the governor and council semi-annually, or 
oftener upon request, of the amount of capital, debts, deposits, circulation, and cash on 
hand; (4) forbade dealings in merchandise or bank stock on penalty of forfeiture of double 
the value, half to go to the informer; (5) limited the votes per stockholder to ten”). 
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while “[a]n equal vote to each stockholder, however great or small his interest 
in the institution, allows not that degree of weight to large stockholders which 
it is reasonable they should have, and which, perhaps, their security and that of 
the bank require.”132 
Hamilton’s statements do not sufficiently clarify his motives for advocating 
the adoption of voting restrictions in the Bank of the United States. But read in 
light of contemporary controversies and Hamilton’s overall concerns and 
objectives for the Bank, it seems more consistent with the consumer protection 
account of voting restrictions than with investor protection.133 The Bank of 
North America of 1781—the backdrop against which Hamilton formulated his 
proposals—had been arguably “‘all but crippled’ during the 1790s because a 
few powerful borrowers had monopolized its funds.”134 
Throughout his “Report on a National Bank,” Hamilton sought to 
reconcile the interests of investors and those of the general public.135 He 
seemed particularly concerned with mitigating profit-maximizing behavior by 
the Bank’s shareholders to the detriment of consumers, as well as with 
preventing favoritism in lending decisions. He defended, for instance, the 
constitution of a bank with a large capital, because shareholders, fearing a 
decrease in profits, might resist subsequent capital increases that are beneficial 
 
132.  Alexander Hamilton, Report on a National Bank, Communicated to the House of 
Representatives, Dec. 14, 1790, reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 388, 423 
(Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1904). The voting rule ultimately adopted provided as follows: 
for one share and not more than two shares, one vote; for every two shares above 
two, and not exceeding ten, one vote; for every four shares above ten, and not 
exceeding thirty, one vote; for every six shares above thirty, and not exceeding 
sixty, one vote; for every eight shares above sixty, and not exceeding one 
hundred, one vote; and for every ten shares above one hundred, one vote; But no 
person, co-partnership, or body politic, shall be entitled to a greater number than 
thirty votes. 
  National Bank Act, § 7, 1 Stat. 191, 193 (1791). 
133.  See Sommer, supra note 19, at 1042 (“Although this rationale [described in Hamilton’s 
Report] can be read as providing for community control of the merchants, it reads more 
logically as providing mercantile control of the directors. In theory, regressive voting would 
ensure that the respectable merchants would collectively dominate the bank, but would keep 
individual merchants (or factions) from oppressing the rest.” (footnote omitted)). 
134.  LAMOREAUX, supra note 127, at 7 (quoting FRITZ REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN 
BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS 11 (1947)). 
135.  Hamilton, supra note 132, at 419 (also arguing that “[p]ublic utility is more truly the object 
of public banks than private profit. And it is the business of government to constitute them 
on such principles, that, while the latter will result in a sufficient degree to afford competent 
motives to engage in them, the former be not made subservient to it”). 
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to the Bank’s security and to its customers. “Banks are among the best 
expedients for lowering the rate of interest in a country,” he argued, 
but, to have this effect, their capitals must be completely equal to all the 
demands of business, and such as will tend to remove the idea, that the 
accommodations they afford are in any degree favors—an idea very apt 
to accompany the parsimonious dispensation of contracted funds. In 
this, as in every other case, the plenty of commodity ought to beget a 
moderation of price. 
Hamilton also proposed a mandatory rotation of directors, a rule that he 
deemed to reduce “the danger of combinations among the directors, to make 
the institution subservient to party views, or to the accommodation, preferably, 
of any particular set of men.”136 
Ownership and control of banks by their merchant customers—and voting 
restrictions designed to reinforce that control—presumably served not just to 
constrain exploitation of monopoly power, but also to inhibit the banks from 
assuming an inefficient amount of risk, the costs of which would fall upon the 
banks’ customers. Clearly this was the reason for the dominance of mutual and 
nonprofit firms among savings banks—which in the nineteenth century were a 
distinct class of institutions from the commercial banks we are concerned with 
here—prior to the advent of effective governmental regulation of reserves 
beginning in the late 1840s.137 While the threat to customers of inefficient risk-
taking was surely much higher in savings banks than in commercial banks, 
merchants whose notes were discounted by commercial banks clearly had a 
strong interest in the continuing creditworthiness of the banknotes or other 
credits issued by the banks in exchange. 
Indeed, viewed in this latter respect, consumer ownership of commercial 
banks also helps explain other common charter provisions beyond shareholder 
voting rules. It was common for early bank charters to specifically prevent 
banks from engaging in trade or dealing in merchandise.138 Such provisions 
seem more likely to have been intended as consumer protection than as 
investor protection. In particular, they plausibly served to limit the riskiness of 
the banks, and perhaps also prevented the banks from competing with their 
local merchant-owners. 
 
136.  Id. at 420-21. 
137.  HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 246-64. 
138.  See, e.g., 2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 69 (describing a charter amendment prohibiting the 
Massachusetts Bank from dealing in merchandise). 
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The early nineteenth-century commercial banks gradually transitioned 
from consumer ownership to investor ownership.139 What accounted for this 
transition? Increased competition seems a likely answer, as localities came to 
have more than a single bank and, beginning in the 1860s, bank entrepreneurs 
had the alternative of a federal charter as well as a state charter (though the 
widespread limitations on both interstate and intrastate branch banking 
continued to limit effective competition).140 Expanding state and federal 
regulation presumably also reduced the riskiness of banks, and was perhaps 
important as well in providing some assurance to merchants that their local 
bank would not discriminate against them in favor of their competitors. 
2.  Insurance 
Voting restrictions also appeared among early property and casualty 
insurance companies.141 Maximum vote provisions were common, although 
not universal, in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century stock insurance 
companies in Pennsylvania and Massachusetts.142 Approximately one third of 
stock insurance corporations chartered by special act in Connecticut through 
1856 adopted restricted voting schemes.143 By contrast, the overwhelming 
majority of New York finance and insurance companies144 and New Jersey 
insurance companies145 granted voting rights in direct proportion to share 
 
139.  For a description of this process, see LAMOREAUX, supra note 127. Lamoreaux focuses on an 
intermediate stage of the process, in which the banks remained under the partial ownership 
and control of their merchant customers, and argues that those customers provided 
reputational reassurance to prospective non-customer investors: “[i]nvestors knew that 
when they bought stock in a bank they were actually investing in the diversified enterprises 
of that institution’s directors.” Id. at 5. We do not engage the latter issue here. 
140.  See Prasad Krishnamurthy, Financial Market Integration and Firm Growth (Sept. 20, 2012) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
141.  2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 246-47 (noting that, with respect to late eighteenth-century 
insurance companies, “regressive voting, or else one vote per share up to a maximum of ten, 
thirty, or fifty, was the rule”). 
142.  DODD, supra note 51, at 225; JAMES MEASE, THE PICTURE OF PHILADELPHIA 109-12 
(Philadelphia, B&T Kite 1811); see also Ratner, supra note 10, at 7-8 (citing an 1832 
Massachusetts statute on insurance companies capping the number of votes at thirty per 
shareholder). 
143.  Dreier, supra note 52, at 23. 
144.  Hilt, supra note 14, at 657-58. 
145.  CADMAN, supra note 32, at 308-09. 
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ownership. Our multi-state analysis shows 38% of insurance companies 
chartered between 1790 and 1859 adopting restricted voting. 
A significant number of the early insurance corporations were, both in 
name and substance, mutual insurance companies. These firms were owned by 
their customers—the insured—and typically adopted one vote per member or 
another form of stringent voting restrictions. Early mutual insurance 
companies were particularly common in the fire insurance business.146 The 
economies of scale in building an insurance pool gave many of these companies 
substantial monopoly power, and created a strong incentive for collective 
ownership by their customers.147 
While many consumer-owned insurance companies were organized 
formally as mutuals, a number of insurance companies formed as joint stock 
corporations were also effectively mutuals, serving principally to insure their 
shareholders. In this sense, the history of insurance companies is essentially 
akin to, and closely related with, that of banks.148 As described by Alfred 
Chandler in the context of marine insurance, “[b]y pooling resources in an 
incorporated insurance company, resident merchants, importers, exporters, 
and a growing number of specialized shipping enterprises were able to get 
cheaper insurance rates”; as a result, “[n]early all these companies handled 
only the business of local shippers and ship owners.”149 The local element of 
early insurance firms was made explicit in their charter provisions; state 
 
146.  The first U.S. insurance company was, famously, the Philadelphia Contributionship, a 
mutual firm founded with the assistance of Benjamin Franklin in 1752. F.C. Oviatt, Historical 
Study of Fire Insurance in the United States, 26 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 155, 157 
(1905). 
147.  HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 278. However, while the mutual form of organization mitigated 
potential conflicts between investors and consumers, it also gave rise to disputes among 
heterogeneous consumers themselves. For instance, a decision by the Contributionship 
board to stop insuring houses surrounded by trees (for they arguably hindered fire-fighting 
efforts) caused much discontent among some of its members, who ultimately created a new 
mutual insurance company to provide such coverage upon payment of an additional 
premium—the Mutual Assurance Company, whose symbol, fittingly, was a green tree. See 
Oviatt, supra note 146, at 157. In Currie’s Administrators v. Mutual Assurance Society, 14 Va. (4 
Hen. & M.) 315 (1809), a member sued over an amendment to the charter of a mutual 
insurance corporation increasing the premium to be charged from residents in the town vis-
à-vis those of the country. The court held that the amendment had been approved by a 
majority of the corporation and was therefore valid. 
148.  2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 245-46 (stressing the close relationship between banks and 
insurance firms). Davis notes that “the merchant class demanded both services and naturally 
tended to control both types of institutions.” Id. at 246. 
149.  CHANDLER, supra note 17, at 31, 32. 
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citizenship—or, in some cases, town residency—requirements for directors 
were common.150 
Take, for example, the Insurance Company of North America, the first U.S. 
stock insurance company, which was chartered in Philadelphia in 1784. 
Historians attribute the decision to transform what was initially a failing 
tontine into a marine insurance company to John Maxwell Nesbitt, one of its 
founders and its future president who, as virtually all leading merchants at the 
time, had significant experience both as a policyholder and underwriter of 
marine insurance.151 The company came to insure the ventures of many of its 
shareholders and directors—a situation expressly contemplated and permitted 
by the corporation’s charter, provided that insiders did not receive special 
privileges.152 However, not all prospective customers were able to become 
shareholders in the company. In fact, the Pennsylvania legislature granted a 
charter to another marine insurance company, the Insurance Company of the 
State of Pennsylvania, signed into law just four days after the charter of its 
predecessor, with the justification that “a number of the ship owners and 
traders of Philadelphia, from local circumstance, have not been able to obtain 
shares in [the Insurance Company of North America].”153 Both insurance 
companies adopted a graduated voting scheme, subject to an absolute cap on 
the number of votes per shareholder.154 
 
150.  2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 324. Prohibitions on interlocking directorates were also 
widespread. 
151.  See MARQUIS JAMES, BIOGRAPHY OF A BUSINESS 1792-1942: INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH 
AMERICA 16 (1942) (noting that leading Philadelphia merchants of the time previously 
“banded together to insure one another’s shipping ventures”); THOMAS HARRISON 
MONTGOMERY, A HISTORY OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA OF 
PHILADELPHIA 11 (Philadelphia, Press of Review 1885). 
152.  An Act to Incorporate the Subscribers to the Insurance Company of North America, ch. 220, 
§ 7, 1794 Pa. Laws 489, 494 [hereinafter Insurance Company of North America Act] (“Any 
member of the corporation may, nevertheless, become assured thereby, on any vessel, 
goods, wares, merchandise, or lives, in the same manner and with the same effect, as if such 
member had no interest in the corporation.”); JAMES, supra note 151, at 36. 
153.  MONTGOMERY, supra note 151, at 43 (emphasis omitted) (quoting the report of the legislative 
committee on the companies’ charter applications). 
154.  Insurance Company of North America Act, supra note 152, at 492 (granting one vote per 
share up to fifty shares, one vote for every ten shares above fifty, subject to a cap of one 
hundred votes per shareholder, in his own right or as a proxy); An Act to Incorporate the 
Insurance Company of the State of Pennsylvania, ch. 227, § 4, 1794 Pa. Laws 512, 516 
(providing one vote for the first share, one vote for every two shares up to ten, and one vote 
for every four shares up to thirty, subject to a maximum of twenty-four votes per 
shareholder). 
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Leading merchants were also instrumental in establishing the first stock 
insurance corporation in Connecticut, the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 
in 1810. According to P. Henry Woodward, “[a] sense of ever-present peril, a 
desire to avert the worst effects of calamity from the immediate sufferer by 
distributing the loss through the community, and a willingness to contribute 
fairly to the common fund, brought the company into existence”; even though 
its subscribers certainly intended to make a profit, “money-making was a 
secondary consideration.”155 Nevertheless, its shareholders and directors turned 
out not to be avid purchasers of insurance policies, and the company initially 
struggled for lack of a clientele.156 The corporation’s charter granted voting 
rights in proportion to share ownership.157 
The inspiration for the establishment of another fire insurance company in 
Hartford came from merchants who were previously customers of the Hartford 
Fire Insurance Company. Interestingly, their main motivation for creating a 
competing business was allegedly not the firm’s monopoly prices, but rather its 
slack customer service. The story goes that the office of Walter Mitchell, the 
secretary and sole salesman of the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, had a 
highly inconvenient location, erratic hours of operation, and no regard for 
agreed-upon appointments. A disgruntled group of merchants then “pooled 
their discontent in a general protest” and incorporated the Aetna Insurance 
Company in 1819.158 Although originally a local endeavor, competition soon led 
the Aetna to expand to other localities and procure outside business through 
agents.159 The company’s original charter capped voting rights at fifty per 
 
155.  P. HENRY WOODWARD, INSURANCE IN CONNECTICUT 14 (Boston, D.H. Hurd 1897). 
156.  HAWTHORNE DANIEL, THE HARTFORD OF HARTFORD: AN INSURANCE COMPANY’S PART IN A 
CENTURY AND A HALF OF AMERICAN HISTORY 34 (1960) (noting that “some of the Directors 
were very slow about taking out policies, and a good many of the stockholders apparently 
never did”). 
157.  Id. at 273 app. 
158.  HENRY R. GALL & WILLIAM GEORGE JORDAN, ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF FIRE INSURANCE: 
BEING A HISTORY OF THE AETNA INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, 1819-
1919, at 29 (1919). Gall & Jordan detail that “[t]he trip out to Wethersfield along a clayey 
road, sometimes swamped by rains or rutted by drought, was an exasperating journey at the 
best . . . . Merchants or business men who wanted insurance did not relish the ‘Gone for the 
day’ sign that greeted their eyes so often on the door of his office.” Id. at 28-29. 
159.  Id. at 46 (“It was realized at the very beginning that the local field, shared as it was with 
another company, would be small, and that it would be essential to stimulate outside 
business through carefully selected agents.”). 
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shareholder, a rule that was, however, abandoned in favor of voting by shares 
in 1877.160 
C.  Manufacturing 
In sharp contrast to the types of firms discussed above, one vote per share 
was from the outset the dominant voting rule in U.S. manufacturing 
corporations. Only one out of 135 manufacturing corporations chartered by 
special act in Connecticut through 1856 adopted voting restrictions.161 
Similarly, restricted voting schemes were present in only 2% of the 
manufacturing corporations chartered in New York between 1790 and 1825 and 
5% of such firms incorporated in New Jersey between 1790 and 1867.162 New 
York’s path-breaking general incorporation act for manufacturing firms of 1811 
provided a one-share-one-vote rule—a pattern that prevailed in most such 
statutes subsequently enacted by other states.163 
Our multistate analysis shows 31% of manufacturing firms chartered 
between 1790 and 1859 as having restricted voting, but this proportion is, 
almost certainly, misleadingly high. Manufacturing firms, in contrast to other 
types of firms, appear to have been formed under the period’s new free 
incorporation statutes in substantial numbers from an early stage.164 Indeed, 
 
160.  Id. at 232 app., 236 app. 
161.  Dreier, supra note 52, at 22-23. 
162.  Hilt, supra note 14, at 658 tbl.1; CADMAN, supra note 32, at 206 tbl.1, 207 tbl.2, 309 (finding 
that 15 of 283 manufacturing firms incorporated over this period had restricted voting 
schemes). 
163.  An Act Relative to Incorporations for Manufacturing Purposes, ch. 68, § 3, 1811 N.Y. Laws 
151, 151 [hereinafter Manufacturing Purposes Act]. The Connecticut and Michigan general 
incorporation laws of 1837 followed the New York example. Ratner, supra note 10, at 7. By 
contrast, the 1837 Virginia statute was unusual in providing a regressive, although 
uncapped, graduated scale for manufacturing companies. An Act Prescribing General 
Regulations for the Incorporation of Manufacturing and Mining Companies, ch. 84, § 5, 
1837 Va. Acts 74, 76. 
164.  See W.C. Kessler, A Statistical Study of the New York General Incorporation Act of 1811, 48 J. 
POL. ECON. 877, 879 tbl.1 (1940) (showing that between 1811 and 1848, 362 manufacturing 
corporations were incorporated in New York under the Act of 1811, while only 150 were 
incorporated under special acts); see also Henry N. Butler, Nineteenth-Century Jurisdictional 
Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129, 144 (1985) 
(“Between 1848 and 1871, only 143 business corporations were created under Wisconsin 
general incorporation laws while 1,130 were created by special acts—a ratio of almost eight 
to one. Thus, in Wisconsin as in New York, the constitutionally mandated, dual system did 
not significantly alter the legislators’ behavior toward special charters. In general, it appears 
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the pioneering New York corporation statute of 1811 was limited to 
manufacturing firms. Consequently, manufacturing firms are probably 
underrepresented in these data, which exclude corporations chartered under 
free incorporation statutes. Moreover, there is good reason to believe that the 
omitted manufacturing corporations had a substantially higher ratio of one-
share-one-vote rules than did the specially chartered manufacturing 
corporations included in the data. One reason is that the early statutes 
providing for free incorporation, such as the New York statute of 1811, were not 
only limited to manufacturing firms but also mandated a rule of one-share-
one-vote.165 Thus our multistate analysis presumably understates the 
disparities between the voting rules adopted by manufacturing corporations 
and those adopted by corporations in other industries. Nonetheless, the 
regression reported in Table 2 shows that the frequency of restricted voting 
was significantly smaller in manufacturing corporations than in corporations 
organized to provide banking, bridges, canals, insurance, or roads. 
The trend towards voting by shares in manufacturing firms was already 
apparent upon the incorporation of the pioneering Society for Establishing 
Useful Manufactures (S.U.M.) in New Jersey in 1791. The S.U.M. was a 
privately owned, but state-sponsored, corporation intended to foster the 
development of manufacturing in the United States. Even though the 
corporation was ultimately chartered and headquartered in New Jersey, most 
subscribers were New York capitalists and speculators. Unlike other 
contemporary corporations, which specified the object of the firm with 
considerable precision, the purposes clause of the S.U.M charter was 
exceedingly broad, providing that the corporation was to carry on “the 
Business of Manufactures in this State” and to employ its capital stock in 
“Manufacturing or making all such Commodities or Articles as shall not be 
prohibited by Law.”166 The S.U.M. charter granted one vote per share to 
private shareholders, while limiting the voting rights of the U.S. and state 
governments to one hundred votes each if they were to become shareholders in 
the firm.167 Interestingly, Alexander Hamilton, who vigorously defended the 
 
that the constitutionally mandated, dual system failed to have a negative impact on the 
market for special corporate charters.” (footnote omitted)). 
165.  Manufacturing Purposes Act, supra note 163, at 151. 
166.  1 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 380. 
167.  Id. at 382-83. 
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adoption of voting restrictions in the First Bank of the United States, was one 
of the chief promoters of the S.U.M.168 
While many of the early corporations previously examined—such as bank, 
insurance, and transportation companies—were customer-owned local 
monopolies, shareholders of manufacturing corporations were almost always 
investors, not consumers. In contrast to the public utilities of the time, most 
manufacturing firms that required enough capital to employ the corporate 
form—which produced mostly textiles and, in smaller numbers, glass and 
metal169—were likely to be part of a reasonably broad market and thus face 
substantial competition. Moreover, the consumers of manufacturing firms 
were generally so dispersed, and purchased their products so sporadically, that 
they could not be efficiently organized to become owners of the enterprise. In 
this respect, they contrasted with the users of turnpikes, banks, and insurance 
companies, who would have continuously transacted with those service 
providers at a fairly constant rate of expenditure. Finally, as Donald Smythe 
observes, manufacturing firms required more active and innovative 
management than the early public utilities, and were therefore best served by 
active owners who faced and reacted to strong financial incentives, as 
compared to the broad cross-section of customers who presumably shared 
ownership of the monopolistic service industries.170 
i i .  ultra vires as consumer protection 
The recognition that a great number of early business corporations were 
owned by consumers rather than investors can shed light on other historical 
aspects of corporate law beyond shareholder voting rights. Another prominent 
feature of nineteenth-century corporation law that later fell into desuetude was 
a strong doctrine of “ultra vires” (literally, “beyond the powers”), which 
essentially prohibited corporate managers from deviating from the particular 
set of activities (or “purposes”) set forth in the corporation’s charter. 
Nineteenth-century business corporations typically listed in their charters a 
relatively narrow and specific set of corporate purposes. Corporate acts falling 
outside the scope of the specified purposes were subject to particularly 
stringent remedies, which ranged from shareholder and state lawsuits against 
 
168.  For a very thorough review of the establishment and early development of the S.U.M., see 
id. at 349-89. 
169.  2 DAVIS, supra note 29, at 275-79; SEAVOY, supra note 27, at 62-64. 
170.  See Smythe, supra note 18, at 1419. 
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corporate managers to the voiding of ultra vires contracts by the corporation or 
its counterparty.171 
Since the late nineteenth century, this restrictive approach to corporate 
purposes has been progressively abandoned in both law and practice.172 Two 
conventional explanations have been offered for the rise and fall of the ultra 
vires doctrine. The first is that a narrow definition and construal of corporate 
powers made sense at a time in which incorporation conferred special 
privileges, a rationale that faded with the decline of the franchise view of the 
corporation, the spread of general incorporation statutes, and the gradual 
acceptance of general purpose clauses. The second is that the ultra vires 
doctrine served as a form of investor protection, assuring investors that their 
capital contributions to the firm would only be used in industries or activities 
in whose profitability they had some faith.173 The abandonment of the doctrine 
 
171.  Interestingly, the old doctrine to the effect that ultra vires contracts are void was not part of 
the ancient English common law, but rather a U.S. legal development. See 2 ARTHUR W. 
MACHEN, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS 826 (1908) (“If ultra vires 
contracts of royal-charter corporations were binding at common law, the universal and 
apparently spontaneous growth in America of the doctrine that ultra vires contracts of all 
kinds of corporations are void is very difficult to explain.”). 
172.  See, e.g., ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 675-76 (1986) (describing the ultra vires 
problem as only of historical interest); 1 WILLIAM W. COOK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
CORPORATIONS HAVING A CAPITAL STOCK, at vii (4th ed. Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1898) 
(noting that “[t]he doctrine of ultra vires is disappearing”). But see Kent Greenfield, Ultra 
Vires Lives!: A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How Corporate Law 
Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279 (2001) (arguing that the ultra 
vires doctrine subsists in depriving managers of authority to commit illegal acts). 
173.  Some later interpretations of ultra vires have treated the doctrine as protecting the interests 
of investors. See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 122 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932) (arguing that the strict purpose 
limitations of nineteenth-century firms were “probably designed to prevent corporations 
from dominating the business life of the time,” but that “to the shareholder, however, it 
meant that he knew the particular enterprise, or at the widest, the type of business in which 
his capital was to be embarked”); Michael A. Schaeftler, Ultra Vires—Ultra Useless: The Myth 
of State Interest in Ultra Vires Acts of Business Corporations, 9 J. CORP. L. 81, 81 & n.1 (1983) 
(“The judicially-created doctrine of ultra vires evolved as a mechanism for the protection of 
shareholder interests . . . [since] [s]upposedly, a critical factor in the investment decisions of 
shareholders is the scope of permissible business activities in which a corporation may 
engage.”). 
          The view of purpose restrictions as an investor protection device was explicitly 
articulated in the prominent decision in Colman v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., (1846) 50 
Eng. Rep. 481 (Rolls Ct.); 10 Beav. 1, which marked the overt recognition of the ultra vires 
doctrine in English law. The dispute concerned the authority of a railroad corporation to 
invest in a steam packet company, a strategy designed to increase the railroad’s passenger 
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in more recent times is then explained on the grounds that it was ultimately 
ineffective and rendered unnecessary by the advent of the norm of shareholder 
supremacy and by the increasing liquidity of securities markets and the easy 
exit this permitted for shareholders unhappy with a corporation’s change of 
activities.174 
We suggest that purpose restrictions might have served an additional 
important function in those early corporations—such as turnpikes, banks, and 
insurance companies—that were in essence consumer cooperatives. In 
consumer-owned firms, the nature and specifics of the business that the 
corporation engages in matter a great deal from a shareholder’s perspective. 
The early turnpike cases in which shareholders refused to pay for their 
subscriptions after a change in the proposed location of the road provide an 
illustrative example of this concern.175 A strong ultra vires doctrine not only 
assured firm members that their contributions would be channeled to the 
desired services, but also reduced the potential for using rents from the 
monopoly activity to cross-subsidize another activity that had a different 
distribution of benefits across the firm’s shareholders—a problem that haunts 
 
traffic. In enjoining the transaction as ultra vires, the court argued that “a railway 
investment should not be considered a wild speculation, exposing those engaged in it to all 
sorts of risks, whether they intended it or not.” Id. at 18. Accordingly, the court enforced the 
charter limitations even as it acknowledged that the ultra vires activities could be financially 
rewarding to the firm. Id. at 15 (“I am far from saying that that which is proposed to be done 
might not be extremely profitable to this company.”). Interestingly, the fact that the 
shareholder plaintiff in the case was clearly defending not the financial interests of regular 
investors, but the conflicting interest of a competing navigation company whose position 
was threatened by the proposed transaction, did not seem to influence the court’s reasoning. 
For a discussion of the Colman decision, see Harry Rajak, Judicial Control: Corporations and 
the Decline of Ultra Vires, 26 CAMBRIAN L. REV. 9, 16-18 (1995). 
174.  Greenfield, supra note 172, at 1284 (arguing that although once the norm of shareholder 
supremacy and the profit maximization rule were put into place, shareholders no longer 
needed ultra vires for protection from corporate overreach, the doctrine still increases 
transparency to shareholders); Michael A. Schaeftler, Clearing Away the Debris of the Ultra 
Vires Doctrine—A Comparative Examination of U.S., European, and Israeli Law, 16 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 71, 106-07 (1984) (showing that as distrust of corporations gave way to 
acceptance, and as states sought to attract business, legislators broadened the statutory 
language authorizing incorporation to include a wide-ranging purpose clause in place of 
ultra vires restrictions); Schaeftler, supra note 173, at 86 (arguing that the right of the state 
to challenge ultra vires activities lost “much of its persuasive force” with “the emergence of 
new attitudes towards the corporation in modern times”). 
175.  See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text. 
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cooperatives up to this day.176 Moreover, the binding character of the proposed 
lines of business helped assure early shareholder-merchants that their 
corporate subscriptions would not be used to fund potential competitors. This 
concern was at the heart of the case of Colman v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., 
which contains what is arguably the first overt reference to ultra vires in 
English law.177 
Nevertheless, as product market competition increased the prevalence of 
purely investor-owned firms, this early function of the ultra vires doctrine lost 
its raison d’être for most business corporations. If what a shareholder expects 
from the firm is not a specific product or service, but a profit—the fungible 
good par excellence—the precise purposes and activities specified in a corporate 
charter should be comparatively less important. Indeed, flexibility in switching 
lines of business in response to changing market conditions and technological 
advances is critical to maintaining profitability. It should therefore come as no 
surprise that, in parallel to the decline of the ultra vires doctrine, investor-
owned business corporations came to take advantage of the law’s permission to 
craft exceedingly general purpose clauses that do not impose any meaningful 
limitation to their scope of action.178 
Consequently, ultra vires was gradually abandoned as investor-owned 
firms came to dominate the corporate landscape. Consistent with this 
interpretation, (i) the ultra vires doctrine first started to lose its force as applied 
to manufacturing firms (which, as noted above, were overwhelmingly investor 
owned)179 and (ii) ultra vires has only subsisted (although in increasingly 
weakened form) in firms where the corporate purpose is not profit, such as 
 
176.  See Abhijit Banerjee et al., Inequality, Control Rights, and Rent Seeking: Sugar Cooperatives in 
Maharashtra, 109 J. POL. ECON. 138 (2001) (finding evidence that controlling members of 
sugar cooperatives in India engage in rent-seeking by directing the firm to enter into 
ancillary activities that provide disproportionate benefits to themselves). 
177.  D.L., Ultra Vires, 25 AM. L. REG. 513, 514-15 (1877); see supra note 173 and accompanying text. 
The formulation of U.S. case law on the consequences of charter limitations of corporate 
powers long preceded these developments in Britain. D.L., supra, at 515. 
178.  See, e.g., FOURTH AMENDED AND RESTATED CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION OF GOOGLE 
INC., art. III (June 22, 2012) (“The nature of the business or purposes to be conducted or 
promoted by the Corporation is to engage in any lawful act or activity for which 
corporations may be organized under the General Corporation Law of the State of 
Delaware.”). 
179.  HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937, at 60 (1991) (noting 
that courts first relaxed the application of the ultra vires doctrine with respect to 
manufacturing corporations). 
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nonprofit corporations in general and charities in particular.180 Although 
voting restrictions persisted as the norm in consumer cooperatives’ law and 
practice, the courts’ willingness to police ultra vires acts in cooperatives faded 
just as it did with respect to business corporations.181 But unlike business 
corporations, cooperatives continue to include purpose restrictions in their 
charters, as required under some statutes and encouraged by tax laws182 and, 
more importantly, because this avoids the strong conflicts of interest, and 
consequent governance problems, that arise when different groups of owners 
have conflicting interests in a firm’s activities.183 
i i i .  the decline of voting restrictions 
Throughout this paper, we have sought to demonstrate the link between 
shareholder voting restrictions and consumer ownership of monopolistic 
corporations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Just as in the 
twentieth century,184 restricted voting schemes historically functioned as 
 
180.  James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 MD. L. REV. 218, 237 (2003) (“The 
duty of obedience mandates that the board refrain from transactions and activities that are 
ultra vires, that is, beyond the corporation’s powers and purposes as expressed in its 
certificate of incorporation.”); Linda Sugin, Resisting the Corporatization of Nonprofit 
Governance: Transforming Obedience into Fidelity, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 893, 900 (2007) 
(“While the ultra vires doctrine is nearly dead in the jurisprudence of for-profit 
corporations, it is potentially powerful in nonprofit enforcement . . . .”). 
181.  See, e.g., Cal. Canning Peach Growers v. Harkey, 78 P.2d 1137, 1148 (Cal. 1938) (holding that 
the same legal regime applicable to an ultra vires contract by “an ordinary commercial 
corporation” applied to cooperatives). 
182.  CHARLES T. AUTRY & ROLAND F. HALL, THE LAW OF COOPERATIVES 3 (2009). 
183.  See HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 120-67. 
184.  The comeback of voting restrictions in the twentieth century aimed primarily at avoiding 
corporate takeovers—be they by foreign firms at the expense of national ownership of 
industry, by corporate raiders to the detriment of managerial interests, or by investors at the 
expense of consumers. See, e.g., Thomas J. André, Jr., Cultural Hegemony: The Exportation of 
Anglo-Saxon Corporate Governance Ideologies to Germany, 73 TUL. L. REV. 69, 167 (1998) 
(attributing the adoption of voting caps by German companies in the 1970s to the threat of 
foreign takeovers fueled by oil wealth from the Middle East); Marcello Bianchi, Magda 
Bianco & Luca Enriques, Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control 
in Italy, in THE CONTROL OF CORPORATE EUROPE 154, 160 (Fabrizio Barca & Marco Becht 
eds., 2001) (describing the prevalence of voting caps among privatized firms and cooperative 
banks in Italy in the 1990s); Ronald J. Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: 
Structural Limitations on the Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REV. 775, 814-15 (1982) (explaining 
the potential use of voting caps as an antitakeover device in the United States during the 
1970s). 
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takeover defenses, albeit of a different kind. Unlike their modern counterparts, 
voting restrictions in early business corporations served not to shield corporate 
management and employees from a hostile acquisition, but rather to protect 
consumers by preventing the corporation from falling under the control of 
either a profit-maximizing investor or of a single merchant who would favor 
his own business over other local merchants in setting output allocation and 
pricing policies. 
The consumer protection account predicts that the disappearance of voting 
restrictions would follow a shift from consumer to purely investor ownership 
of business corporations. We suggest that the nineteenth century witnessed 
precisely such a shift, for several reasons. 
A.  Governmental Provision of Infrastructure 
By the late nineteenth century, general physical infrastructure, such as 
roads and bridges, were commonly financed and frequently owned and 
operated by government at one or another level, removing the need to fund 
such projects through quasi-philanthropic financing in which prospective 
beneficiaries purchased non-remunerative shares in private corporations. This 
expansion of the role of government paralleled more general changes in the 
structure of government in the first decades of the new nation, which saw the 
municipal corporation, in particular, evolve from its medieval role as a 
politically closed guild-like regulator of commerce to a new incarnation as a 
relatively democratic institution supported by general taxes rather than fees 
and flexibly organized to provide a variety of collective goods and services.185 In 
effect, the shift from provision by a private corporation with restricted voting 
to provision by local government involved the replacement of a makeshift type 
of cooperative with a much more durable one. Local governments are, after all, 
effectively territorial consumer cooperatives established in large part to provide 
services that would otherwise be local monopolies.186 And, of course, modern 
democratic governments have abandoned old practices of censitary suffrage in 
favor of the same highly restricted voting scheme that is the norm in consumer 
cooperatives—namely, the rule of one person, one vote. 
 
185.  See TEAFORD, supra note 22, at 16-34. 
186.  See Henry Hansmann, Ownership and Organizational Form, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
ORGANIZATIONAL ECONOMICS 891, 910 (Robert Gibbons & John Roberts eds., 2013). 
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B.  Separation of Competition Law from Corporation Law 
The scope of corporate law became increasingly narrow during the course 
of the nineteenth century, as the field progressively specialized in the respective 
rights and duties of a firm’s shareholders, managers, and creditors—the 
“internal affairs” of the corporation. Concerns about monopoly—which were 
initially addressed by limitations in charter provisions and in corporation 
statutes—became increasingly extraneous to this area of law.187 Early corporate 
charters and statutes contained several mechanisms that regulated monopoly 
pricing and dissuaded anticompetitive combinations—of which restricted 
voting is but one unappreciated instance.188 Over time, however, the regulation 
of monopoly (natural or otherwise) came to be the object of specialized areas of 
law—namely, antitrust law and utility regulation—that were much better 
focused, and less needlessly constraining, than were charter-based corporate 
voting restrictions. 
C.  Evolution and Differentiation of Standard Corporation Statutes 
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the franchise view of the 
corporation was all but abandoned. Since the Supreme Court decision in 
Charles River Bridge in 1837, monopoly privileges were no longer implied by the 
mere grant of a corporate charter, and they became increasingly rare 
thereafter.189 Moreover, general incorporation laws, which allowed firms to 
incorporate without the need to obtain special legislative charters and 
 
187.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 179, at 243 (noting that by the early twentieth century antitrust 
policy was already recognized as entirely distinct from state corporate law, so that 
compliance with corporate laws was no longer a defense against claims of anticompetitive 
conduct). 
188.  Hovenkamp has highlighted what turned out to be powerful antitrust provisions of early 
corporate charters, which frequently prevented corporations from operating out-of-state, 
from holding shares in other corporations, and from engaging in activities not expressly 
contemplated by the charter. Id. at 63. These restrictions, in turn, led many firms to adopt 
the trust form in order to obtain greater organizational flexibility—hence the term antitrust. 
Id. at 64. Similarly, many other forms of regulation in the nineteenth century, including 
pricing schemes for public utilities, also took place via corporate charters. Id. at 126. In fact, 
before the Supreme Court decision in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), it was not even 
clear that states had constitutional authority to regulate unincorporated entities. 
189.  In Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837), the Court construed a 
corporate charter of a bridge company narrowly and refused to imply an exclusive privilege 
to operate a bridge in the same location. The case became a watershed in the history of 
business corporations in the United States by dissociating corporations from monopoly. 
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conferred no exclusive privileges, gradually became dominant after the mid-
nineteenth century; by the end of the century, they were the typical basis for 
incorporation, rendering the corporate form easily available to entrepreneurs 
seeking to raise outside capital.190 
As this standardization and generalization of business corporation law 
proceeded, making that body of law particularly suited to investor-owned 
firms, separate statutes were adopted specifically to govern consumer-owned 
mutual and cooperative corporations. Maryland, for example, passed a special 
statute governing mutual savings and loan associations in 1843, and was 
followed by New Jersey in 1847, Pennsylvania in 1850, and subsequently other 
states as well.191 In 1857, New York adopted one of the first mutual insurance 
company acts.192 And, while early business corporations included many 
cooperatives in disguise, from the mid-nineteenth century onward cooperatives 
began to be recognized as a distinctive form of organization and to be expressly 
formed and labeled as such.193 Scholars typically view the establishment of the 
Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers, an English consumer cooperative, in 
1844 as marking the birth of the cooperative movement and the first 
enunciation of cooperative principles, including the rule of one member, one 
vote.194 In 1865, Michigan enacted the first U.S. cooperative corporation 
statute,195 followed within a few years by Massachusetts, New York, 
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separate organizational form for cooperatives for most of the nineteenth century and beyond 
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organizational form granting limited liability to worker cooperatives may have played an 
important role in the enactment of the English Joint Stock Companies Act in 1856. ROB 
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COLONIES 1854-1920, at 67-76 (2009). Similarly, the first cooperative statutes in Brazil date 
back to the twentieth century; before then, companies serving cooperative functions were 
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195.  Charles E. Nieman, Revolving Capital in Stock Cooperative Corporations, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. 
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Pennsylvania, Connecticut, and Minnesota.196 These cooperative statutes 
regularly imposed a mandatory rule of one member, one vote.197 The statutes 
for mutuals generally did not make such a voting rule mandatory, though the 
structure of their business would generally have rendered the number of shares 
held by customer-owners similar.198 
The result was that consumer-owned and producer-owned firms, as 
distinct from investor-owned firms, increasingly faced the option of 
organizing, not as jury-rigged business corporations, but under specialized 
statutes that provided explicitly for the formation of cooperative and mutual 
corporations. And while voting restrictions have disappeared from the basic 
business corporation statutes, and in practice from publicly traded corporations 
in general, the sharply restricted rule of one-member-one-vote has subsisted as 
the voting rule commonly chosen by cooperatives.199 
The anti-monopoly role played by restricted voting in the early nineteenth 
century was, by the end of the century, largely taken over by these mutual and 
cooperative corporations. A dramatic example involves the large farmer-owned 
marketing cooperatives that started to form in the late nineteenth century in 
direct response to the growing market power of investor-owned grain 
elevators, grain brokers, and railroads, often exercised through cartels. By 
around 1910, after more than a decade of economic warfare, the farmer-owned 
 
196.  Kimberly A. Zeuli & Robert Cropp, Cooperatives: Principles and Practices in the 21st Century, 
UW EXTENSION 17 (2004), http://www.learningstore.uwex.edu/pdf/A1457.pdf. There is 
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290, § 7, 1866 Mass. Laws 270, 272; An Act Relating to the Organization of Co-Operative 
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102. 
198.  E.g., An Act to Encourage the Establishment of Mutual Savings Associations, 1847 N.J. Laws 
172, 172 (providing no voting rule but stating, in the Preamble, the intent to facilitate 
creation of associations permitting members to accumulate a fund “to be finally distributed 
equally among them”). 
199.  Bruce J. Reynolds, Thomas W. Gray & Charles A. Kraenzle, Voting and Representation 
Systems in Agricultural Cooperatives, USDA iii-iv (June 1997), http://www.rurdev.usda.gov 
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supra note 10, at 8 n.41. 
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marketing cooperatives achieved dominance over investor-owned firms in the 
markets for the major grain crops200—a position that the cooperatives largely 
retain today.201 Indeed, mutual and cooperative firms continue to account for a 
large fraction of the nation’s economic activity. Farmer cooperatives market 
roughly a quarter of all farm products and provide farmers with a similar 
fraction of their supplies, such as oil, fertilizer, and seed,202 while mutual 
companies currently write roughly a quarter of all property and liability 
insurance in the United States.203 But, in general, these firms no longer form 
under the basic business corporation statutes. 
D.  Increased Competition 
Increased competition in both capital markets and product markets was 
presumably also important in the decline of voting restrictions. The decline of 
legislative chartering and the rise of free incorporation statutes meant that 
governmentally-granted monopolies became rare outside of regulated 
industries. The development of stock markets made it easier for firms to obtain 
financing, both to undertake capital-intensive infrastructure projects such as 
railroads that had previously relied upon quasi-donative customer financing 
and to compete with established monopolies. Improvements in transportation 
and communication expanded the potential scope of a given firm’s market, 
thereby reducing the market power of local providers of goods and services. 
And, beginning around the middle of the nineteenth century, government 
regulation to protect consumers—such as reserve requirements for banks and 
insurance companies—permitted investor-owned business corporations to 
enter markets for services that had previously been limited to nonprofit and 
mutual enterprise.204 
The suggestion that increased market competition was responsible for the 
decline of voting restrictions in business corporations is not entirely novel. 
Colleen Dunlavy attributes what she sees as the premature abandonment of the 
democratic conception of the corporation in the United States to the early 
intensification of competition for capital in the United States compared to 
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Europe.205 David Ratner, in turn, has speculated that, with the rise of general 
incorporation statutes and the demise of the franchise view of the corporation, 
“the external control afforded by competition supplanted the internal control 
provided by voting restrictions.”206 
We argue, by contrast, that the competition that helped foster a change in 
voting patterns did not take place in capital markets, but rather in product and 
service markets. Moreover, it was not competition in itself, but the decline of 
customer ownership made possible by competitive markets and governmental 
activity, that ultimately led to the abandonment of restricted voting rules. 
E.  Ease of Evasion 
Another reason for the decline is that share ownership with restricted 
voting is an unstable means of restraining monopolistic behavior. Over time, 
increasing numbers of consumer-shareholders are likely to sell their shares to 
non-consumers (or themselves become non-consumers) whose only benefit 
from the shares comes from distributed profits. When the latter shareholders, 
no matter how fragmented, come to hold a majority of the votes among 
themselves, they have an incentive to turn the firm toward profit maximization 
rather than consumer protection. Moreover, the constraint of restricted voting 
structures can often be evaded by various forms of subterfuge, such as breaking 
up a large block of shares into smaller—and hence higher-per-share-vote—
blocks whose nominal ownership is distributed among family and friends. 
These various forms of evasion could largely be avoided by making shares 
in the corporation non-transferable—something that is often permitted or 
required by mutual and cooperative corporation statutes. But the business 
corporation statutes adopted in the nineteenth century, and the interpretations 
that the courts gave those statutes, generally required that shares be freely 
transferable, presumably on the theory that transferability was necessary to 
provide the liquidity that would otherwise be lost owing to the potentially 
infinite life of a business corporation and the inability of its shareholders, 
acting as individuals, to force liquidation of their investment in the firm as they 
could in a partnership. Strong restrictions on the transferability of shares in 
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business corporations came to be accepted only well into the twentieth 
century.207 
F.  The Interests of Small Versus Large Shareholders 
One of the advantages of the one-share-one-vote rule compared to 
restricted voting, from an economic perspective, is that it gives large 
shareholders an incentive to monitor and influence management. But creating 
incentives for shareholder monitoring was arguably less important in the 
consumer-owned enterprises of the early nineteenth century than in the 
average listed corporation today. Because early shareholders transacted with 
the firm on a regular basis in their role as consumers, they were in a better 
position to observe mismanagement than were small and dispersed investors. 
Moreover, early turnpikes, bridges, canals, and banks were fundamentally local 
enterprises, and geographic proximity to the firm’s headquarters and 
operations further facilitated monitoring. Finally, investment shares in the 
consumer-owned enterprises were presumably relatively equal, as they 
typically are in mutual and cooperative firms, since the amount of fire 
insurance bought by local merchants, or the use made of a short turnpike by 
local farmers and merchants, probably did not vary by large amounts. Only 
investors seeking profit would have an incentive to buy a large block of stock in 
such a corporation. 
In contrast, for the purely investor-owned firms that became increasingly 
prevalent among business corporations over the course of the nineteenth 
century, one-share-one-vote was the natural rule. In addition to stimulating 
efficient monitoring, as just described, that rule avoids the exploitation of large 
shareholders by small ones that can result from restricted voting—for example, 
through the threat of holding up efficient transactions in an effort to induce 
redistribution from large to small shareholders. 
In sum, as consumer ownership increasingly came to be either inefficient or 
accommodated through specialized statutes for cooperative and mutual firms, a 
rule of one-share-one-vote naturally became the dominant practice among 
business corporations, as well as the default rule in the business corporation 
statutes and a requirement for listing stock on the nation’s largest stock 
exchange. 
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G.  Mixed and Muddled Motives 
Although we have been seeking here to make a persuasive case for the 
consumer protection theory of restricted voting schemes, we do not mean to 
suggest that there were no other motives behind their adoption, or that the 
reasons for adopting restricted voting—whether consumer protection or 
something else—were always clear in the minds of the individuals who formed 
business corporations or the minds of the legislators who granted individual 
corporate charters or enacted general corporation statutes. 
In the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries, there was clearly 
widespread concern about the power and autonomy of business corporations. 
That vague but strong concern surely extended well beyond the possibility that 
corporations might engage in monopolistic exploitation of their customers. It 
led legislators to impose a variety of relatively arbitrary restrictions on 
incorporated firms—such as maximum lifespans and maximum 
capitalization—that had no special bearing on consumer protection, and that 
were evidently intended simply to limit the power of corporations generally, as 
a prophylactic against unforeseen abuses. Viewed this way, the various 
limitations imposed on early business corporations, including restricted voting, 
appear broadly consistent with Dunlavy’s interpretation of them as an 
expression of the nation’s democratic spirit. 
It is also quite possible that there is some validity to the investor protection 
theory. There may have been firms that adopted restricted voting with the 
intention of protecting small shareholders from large ones. This would not 
have been illogical. The difficulty is that—in contrast with the consumer 
protection theory—we see little direct evidence of this motive. Moreover, as a 
general explanation, it seems inconsistent with both the pattern of restricted 
voting across industries and the gradual disappearance of restricted voting over 
the course of the nineteenth century. 
Eric Hilt, in an article written in response to an earlier draft of this article, 
presents a comparative test of our consumer protection theory with the 
investor protection theory developed earlier by him and others.208 For this 
purpose he reviews the data from his earlier studies, and also adds to that data 
an impressive survey of the wealth and general occupation of shareholders in 
New York corporations as of 1826 who were resident in New York City.209 Hilt 
recognizes the force of the consumer protection theory, accepting in particular 
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that the pattern of restricted voting he observes is consistent with that theory: 
restricted voting rules were nearly ubiquitous in New York turnpike 
companies, almost totally absent in manufacturing companies, and present in 
about a quarter of bank charters. Only the insurance companies in his sample—
which rarely had restricted voting—differ from the pattern we have observed in 
other states.210 Nonetheless, Hilt argues that there is other evidence that 
weighs in favor of the investor protection theory. 
First, Hilt shows that the median wealth of shareholders in manufacturing 
companies was considerably larger than that of shareholders in other types of 
corporations, and that the value of the stock held by the median shareholder 
was much larger in manufacturing companies than in other types of 
corporations. Indeed, he observes that the par value of stock was generally set 
much higher in manufacturing firms than in other types of firms, impeding all 
but the wealthy from buying shares. Hilt concludes from this that, 
“[c]onsistent with the investor protection theory, manufacturing firms did not 
employ graduated voting rights because they had no small investors to protect.”211 
But the logic runs more easily in the other direction. Why did only 
manufacturing firms have no small shareholders? A plausible answer is: 
because manufacturing firms, lacking market power, had no consumers to 
protect. (Hilt himself notes that, “manufacturers often produced 
undifferentiated products such as cotton cloth and faced intense competition 
from domestic and foreign producers, and thus did not hold much market 
power.”212) Consequently, the charters of manufacturing companies did not 
subject them to restricted voting, because the principal purpose of such a rule 
was to facilitate distribution of stock, and, correspondingly, voting power, 
among the firms’ (prospective) customers as protection from product market 
exploitation by the firm. 
Second, Hilt observes that when a company’s charter provided for 
restricted voting, the charter often contained other restrictions that were 
unambiguously designed to protect customers. In particular, the charters of 
turnpike and bridge companies commonly set out in detail the tolls that the 
companies could charge for different types of traffic. Hilt concludes from this 
that turnpike and bridge companies “had no discretion over pricing,” and that 
restricted voting “was therefore most likely motivated by concerns unrelated to 
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the market power of firms.”213 But the strength of this inference is doubtful. 
For one thing, as Hilt concedes, the presence of price restrictions in corporate 
charters is unambiguous evidence that the legislature was concerned about the 
firm’s exercise of monopoly power vis-à-vis consumers.214 For another, it seems 
unlikely that legislators would have believed that price restrictions in a 
company’s charter would successfully eliminate all of a firm’s market power. 
The prices set were maximums; a customer-controlled firm would presumably 
have been free to set lower tolls, or no tolls at all, if costs permitted. Moreover, 
companies subject to charter provisions limiting prices presumably retained the 
ability to increase their profits by cutting their operating and maintenance costs 
to inefficiently low levels. And one must wonder how well the pricing 
provisions in the charters were enforced in any event. The more convincing 
interpretation, it seems, is that legislatures imposed multiple limitations in the 
charters of early corporations that were perceived as monopolies, in the hope 
that together those controls might be effective. Other such (crude) controls, for 
example, included limits on the lifespan of a corporation and on the total assets 
that a corporation could hold. 
But we do not want to overstate our own case. The pattern of restricted 
voting revealed in Table 1 of the Appendix, while broadly consistent with the 
consumer protection theory, contains a great deal of variation—across 
industries, across states, and across time—that seems hard to explain in great 
detail with the consumer protection theory, or with any simple functional 
theory. On top of variations in interests, ideologies, and understanding, there 
was presumably much copying of charter provisions from one firm to another, 
and from one statute to another, without much hard thought as to whether the 
old provisions made sense in the changed context.215 We see further evidence of 
this noisiness when we turn, as we do now, to the historical experience with 
restricted voting in other countries. 
iv.  voting restrictions in comparative perspective 
Early U.S. corporations were not unique in resorting to voting rules that 
limited the number of votes that large shareholders could cast. Similar schemes 
were present among the closest antecedents of the modern business 
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corporation, dating back to the Dutch East India Company, as well as in a 
number of other jurisdictions in the nineteenth century. This Part examines the 
characteristics and the rationale for the adoption of restricted voting in these 
contexts. Although the evidence of consumer ownership in these cases is 
mixed, voting restrictions still appear to serve more plausibly as a response to 
concerns about market power than as a mechanism to protect the financial 
interests of small investors. 
A.  The Dutch East India Company 
The pioneer Dutch East India Company—also known as the VOC, an 
acronym for its Dutch name Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie—is widely 
recognized as the first publicly-traded business corporation.216 The company 
was chartered in 1602 as the product of a merger, clearly designed to eliminate 
competition, of six existing trading companies, each of which previously 
operated as a form of commenda or limited partnership established for single 
voyages.217 In exchange for a grant by the state of a monopoly on the trade 
routes between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan, the VOC 
was also to fulfill public functions such as assisting in wars of independence 
against Spain. 
The VOC charter restricted the voting rights of large shareholders, though 
hardly in a way that benefited minority investors. The company had a two-tier 
shareholding structure composed, on the one hand, of governors or 
bewindhebbers, who were the active merchants who had been in charge of the 
six prior trading companies and had hereditary status, and, on the other hand, 
of the outside investor class of participanten. Bewindhebbers had one vote each 
and only they could be elected to the VOC governing body, the “Seventeen 
Directors.”218 Participanten, by contrast, lacked voting and information rights 
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altogether. Although the VOC’s initial charter gave shareholders the right to 
withdraw their capital contributions after the first ten years, a subsequent 
charter amendment orchestrated by bewindhebbers and the state eliminated this 
right, effectively locking in outside investors against their will.219 
The VOC gradually came to boast most of the key elements of the 
corporate form as we know it today—legal personality, limited liability, 
delegated management, and transferable shares—as well as partial investor 
ownership.220 Nevertheless, the company also was partly owned and entirely 
controlled by the merchant traders in charge of the partnerships that it 
replaced, thus effectively functioning as a consumers’ cooperative. As described 
by a Dutch scholar, similarly to the early companies, “the governors [of the 
VOC] were simultaneously the suppliers of the goods sent to Asia and the 
main buyers of the spices and other goods that the ships returned with.”221 
Until 1623, the governors had a right to prior purchase on the goods shipped 
by the company, which they then resold at a profit. From the perspective of the 
outside investors, the merchant governors were essentially self-dealing by 
charging themselves low prices for the merchandise to the detriment of the 
firm’s profitability.222 Despite the charter’s mandate, dividends were not 
distributed until 1610 and 1612, and then were paid out only in kind—in mace, 
pepper, and nutmeg—at a time in which the market price for these 
commodities was particularly low due to excess supply.223 
In this context, the rule of one vote per governor ensured that no single 
merchant would be able to appropriate the benefits of the firm’s monopoly to 
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himself at the expense of other merchants. The famous episodes involving 
Isaac Le Maire are illustrative of this concern. Initially the largest single 
shareholder in the Amsterdam Chamber224 and a bewindhebber sitting on the 
board of governors, Le Maire was among a handful of directors that apparently 
attempted to divert the firm’s potential trading profits to themselves by 
undertaking an expedition of fourteen ships under their own accounts instead 
of those of the company.225 Since his large shareholdings were not accompanied 
by greater voting power, Le Maire was soon ousted by other governors in 1605 
on charges of embezzlement, and was eventually forced to sign an agreement 
not to compete with the VOC.226 
Having retained stock in the company following this incident, in 1609 Le 
Maire led one of the first expressions of shareholder advocacy.227 Le Maire 
protested in a petition to the VOC board, denouncing the “impotence” of the 
VOC, its failure to make discoveries, and its tendency to send out too few 
ships.228 In addition to his written complaint, Le Maire launched a bear raid 
against the company,229 which ultimately resulted in the enactment of a ban on 
naked short selling.230 But Le Maire’s main source of discontent was not the 
lack of dividend payments by the company, but rather the extended scope of its 
monopoly, which legally (though not practically) prevented him from 
launching competing ventures.231 In fact, Le Maire 
subordinated his . . . criticism [of the company’s corporate governance] 
to his main concern, that the VOC’s monopoly should be restricted and 
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ADVOCACY, supra note 15, at 61, 66. 
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not, as the board wanted, extended. Big merchants such as he and De 
Moucheron were keen to get the scope of the intercontinental trade 
widened and chafed at the unremunerative VOC monopoly.232 
Over time, however, the protests of outside investors were heard. The 
VOC’s charter of 1623 simultaneously curbed self-dealing by the merchant 
governors and increased the rights of large investors. The new charter 
eliminated the governors’ right of prior purchase, only permitting 
bewindhebbers to purchase goods from the company if they had fixed prices or 
were bought in public auctions.233 It also modified the system of director 
compensation by providing for a joint remuneration of one percent of net 
returns in lieu of the prior scheme that was based on the value of the equipping 
of ships.234 At the same time, the charter granted voting and supervisory rights 
to the major shareholders. Major participanten became eligible for a newly 
created Committee of Nine, an early form of supervisory board, and had a say 
in the appointment of governors, but small shareholders remained thoroughly 
disenfranchised.235 
In short, the early VOC was essentially a monopolistic traders’ 
cooperative—a cartel—whose restrictive voting rules were clearly designed not 
to protect small outside shareholders, but instead to protect the firm’s trader-
members from the control of either outside investors or prominent insiders like 
Le Maire. 
B.  Nineteenth-Century Voting Restrictions in England, Brazil, and France 
In recent years, economic historians have documented the presence of 
charter rules limiting the number of votes that large shareholders could cast in 
a variety of jurisdictions in the early nineteenth century.236 This raises the 
question of whether the shift from restricted voting to proportional voting 
paralleled the separation of ownership and consumption in these other 
 
232.  Gelderblom et al., supra note 227, at 50. 
233.  Gepken-Jager, supra note 218, at 66-67. 
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235.  Gepken-Jager, supra note 218, at 57-58; Hopt & Leyens, supra note 222, at 284. 
236.  See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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countries as well—an issue which we have examined in greater detail in a 
companion article.237 
In England, the pattern of shareholder voting rights in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries is largely similar to that of the United States, 
and seems to support the consumer protection account of voting restrictions. 
Restricted voting schemes were particularly common among firms providing 
essential infrastructure services to their merchant-owners—such as canal, 
insurance, and gas lighting companies—but were rarer among purely investor-
owned firms.238 Just like U.S. turnpikes, gas lighting companies in the U.K. 
rarely paid dividends, but this was hardly the object of discontent among 
shareholders, who seemed more than happy to receive a return on their 
investment in the form of lower gas prices.239 
By contrast, the Brazilian Council of State and the French Conseil d’Etat—
the central government bodies in charge of approving requests for 
incorporation—consistently imposed voting caps across the board, without 
regard to industry or ownership structure, as a condition to the grant of a 
corporate charter.240 This poses challenges to both the investor protection and 
the consumer protection interpretations of voting restrictions. To be sure, a 
significant number of early corporations in both jurisdictions had their roots in 
the insurance and public works industries, hinting at their cooperative or 
mutual character.241 Nevertheless, voting restrictions were clearly prevalent 
among purely investor-owned firms as well, which contradicts the 
association—largely present in the United States and Britain—between 
consumer ownership and restricted voting schemes. 
But if the observed patterns on nineteenth-century voting rights in Brazil 
and France fail to confirm the consumer protection view of voting restrictions, 
 
237.  Mariana Pargendler & Henry Hansmann, A New View of Shareholder Voting in the Nineteenth 
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238.  Id. at 587-89. 
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INDUSTRY 1805-1880, at 90 (1991). 
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JURIDIQUE: HISTOIRE ET THÉORIES 116-34 (1910), which describes how French non-profit 
firms in the nineteenth century adopted the corporate form in the absence of more suitable 
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they certainly help to refute the interpretation of these rules as an investor 
protection device. First, both countries’ Councils of State not only insisted on 
strict voting caps but also admitted minimum stock ownership requirements 
for attending and casting votes in shareholder meetings, thereby 
disenfranchising small shareholders.242 Second, the incidence of voting 
restrictions fell precipitously as soon as merchants began to have a real choice 
as to the voting rule following the advent of general incorporation in these 
jurisdictions. Contrary to the view that restricted voting schemes “were critical 
to encouraging the participation of small investors in equity ownership” in 
Brazil,243 voting caps were being abandoned precisely as the country’s capital 
market boomed.244 
conclusion 
Shareholders in business corporations around the world today are generally 
investors whose primary, and typically only, interest in the firm is to obtain a 
financial return.245 The need to protect outside investors against abuse by 
insiders—either managers or controlling shareholders—largely dominates 
corporate law and policy.246 The dominance of investor-owned firms came to 
be such that the application of the U.S. federal securities law regime that 
emerged in the twentieth century—notably, as a result of the Securities Act of 
1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934—is premised on the existence of 
an “investment contract” where the shareholders’ primary interest in the 
enterprise is to “invest for profit.”247 The separation between investment and 
consumption thus became a defining element for the scope of securities 
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regulation, placing possible abuses of shareholder-consumers in cooperative 
corporations, no matter how large,248 outside the purview of securities law. 
Before the late nineteenth century, however, shareholders in a significant 
fraction of business corporations were not primarily interested in obtaining a 
financial return on their investment but rather in having access to the firm’s 
services at reasonable cost. Accordingly, some peculiar features of early 
corporate law and practice—including, in particular, restricted voting 
schemes—served not to protect the shareholders as investors but to protect 
them as consumers. 
By the late nineteenth century, governmental provision of infrastructure 
had expanded, while legal rules addressing problems of market power were 
spun off from the law of business corporations and embodied in separate 
statutory regimes (such as antitrust law, utility regulation, and regulation of 
banking and insurance), and distinct bodies of organizational law were 
developed to cover cooperative corporations. This evolution permitted business 
corporations, and the corporate law that governs them, to focus on the agency 
problems within investor-owned firms—between controlling and non-
controlling shareholders, and between managers and the shareholders as a 
group—for which the rule of one share, one vote appears more suitable than 
restricted voting.249 
The appreciation of the distinctive ownership structure of nineteenth-
century corporations cautions against automatically drawing policy lessons 
from historical practices for the development of capital markets today. 
Contrary to existing suggestions based on a misreading of nineteenth-century 
corporate practice,250 voting caps are as unlikely to protect investors’ interests 
today as they were in the past. For one thing, it is not apparent that, to be 
effective, corporations subject to restricted voting rules require less well-
developed legal regimes than do corporations operating under a rule of one-
share-one-vote. Moreover, there are obvious costs to restricted voting that 
 
248.  See id. Exclusion of cooperatives from coverage by securities law was not a reflection of the 
size of the firms involved. Farmland Industries, for example, had—near its peak, just prior 
to a 2003 restructuring—600,000 farmer-members, 13,800 employees, and $6.5 billion in 
sales. Farmland Industries, NNDB, http://www.nndb.com/company/590/000098296 (last 
visited Oct. 14, 2013). See generally HANSMANN, supra note 8, at 120-22 (noting that among 
other evidence of the economic scale of cooperatives, as of 1992 there were fourteen 
cooperatives among the Fortune 500 largest industrial firms). 
249.  See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
250.  See, e.g., MUSACCHIO, supra note 6, at 253-54 (arguing that historical lessons suggest that 
restricted voting schemes may be more conducive to minority investor protection than the 
rule of one-share, one-vote). 
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seem relatively larger for purely investor-owned firms than for consumer-
owned firms. Restricted voting is likely to discourage investors from investing 
relatively large amounts of money in a firm, since the investment will be 
disproportionally under the control of other smaller investors. Moreover, with 
restricted voting, a firm can fall under the control of entrenched managers 
lacking a strong incentive to maximize profits. And, over time, restricted voting 
rules can be avoided, especially if the courts do not develop and enforce a 
relatively sophisticated set of doctrines to prevent it. Analogous problems 
surely faced the cooperative-type corporations of the early nineteenth century, 
though they may have been relatively modest. The essentially donative share 
purchases in those corporations might not have varied greatly in magnitude 
even without restricted voting. And the geographic propinquity of an 
infrastructural firm’s shareholder/donors may have afforded them relatively 
easy control over the managers of those firms. 
Legal and economic scholarship today focuses heavily on agency problems 
regarding managers and controlling shareholders, and on the evolution of the 
separation between ownership and control that has aggravated those problems. 
If we look back to the nineteenth century, however, we see another 
important—though frequently overlooked—turning point in the history of the 
business corporation: namely, the separation between ownership and 
consumption. Ignoring that earlier phase in the development of the business 
corporation can result in an anachronistic misinterpretation of the restricted 
voting structures that were so widely employed in the past, but that have now 
largely disappeared. Failure to understand the role played by restricted voting 
in the past, moreover, may lead us to overestimate the potential advantages of 
current proposals for a return to restricted voting, in both developing and 
mature economies. 
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appendix:  patterns of restricted voting across 
industries,  states,  and decades 
The results reported in Tables 1 and 2 below are derived from the 
Sylla/Wright data set.251 That data set includes corporations with legislatively 
granted charters, but excludes corporations that formed under statutes—such 
as the New York statute of 1811 for manufacturing firms252—that provided for 
incorporation as of right without special legislative action. For most industries, 
legislatively granted charters were evidently dominant until the middle of the 
nineteenth century even in the presence of incorporation statutes.253 For this 
reason, the pattern of corporate voting rules reflected in the Sylla/Wright data 
set presumably offers a reasonably accurate picture of the relative prevalence of 
restricted voting to be found among firms in different industries, states, and 
decades. That is evidently not true for manufacturing firms, however, as 
discussed in the text.254 Thus, the results in the tables below presumably 
understate the disparities between the voting rules adopted by manufacturing 
corporations and those adopted by corporations in other industries. 
The full data set includes 22,419 observations. The voting rule for each of 
these corporations was coded as “one-share-one-vote,” “one-person-one-vote,” 
“prudent mean” (which includes all capped and graduated voting rules), or 
“not specified.” We aggregated the firms with one-person-one-vote and 
prudent mean rules into a single category of “restricted” voting, permitting us 
to code each firm with a binary variable indicating whether the firm had 
restricted voting or one-share-one-vote. 
The voting rule is specified for less than half the corporations in the 
sample, perhaps because the voting rule was included in the corporate bylaws 
rather than in the charter, or because the voting rule was established by a 
separate statute not located by the coder of the data. For the analyses reported 
here we eliminated all firms for which the voting rule was missing, though this 
of course leaves questions about systematic bias in the sample that remains. We 
were left with a sample of 10,996 firms. We then eliminated all firms chartered 
in states other than the original thirteen, firms operating in industries (usually 
small) other than those reported in the tables below, and all firms incorporated 
in either Massachusetts or South Carolina (because of irregularities that 
 
251.  See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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suggested systematic miscoding or missing data255). We also eliminated all 
observations for the decade of the 1860s, which were quite limited. We were 
finally left with a sample of 6,387 corporations, which we used for the analyses 
reported here. 
The Sylla/Wright data set contains no information on the ownership of the 
firms involved other than the names of the original incorporators. As a 
consequence, it does not permit us to explore directly the relationship between 
firms’ voting rules and the number and nature of their shareholders. 
Table 1 below offers a simple breakdown of the frequency of restricted 
voting rules among firms by industry and decade. Table 2 presents a regression 
analysis in which the dependent variable is an indicator variable taking the 
value of 1 if the firm has a restricted voting rule and 0 if the voting rule is one-
share-one-vote. The omitted variables in that regression are manufacturing 
(industry), Georgia (state), and 1850s (decade). Therefore, each regression 
coefficient in Table 2 reflects the difference between (1) the probability that a 
corporation in the given industry, state, and decade will have a restricted 
voting rule and (2) the probability that a restricted voting rule will be found in 


















255.  Massachusetts and South Carolina, in contrast to the other states, have substantial amounts 
of non-random missing data. The majority of observations for these states do not have a 
voting style specified and the missing data is significantly related to particular business 
types. 
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Table 1.  
percentage of restricted voting charters by industry and decade 
 
 1790s 1800s 1810s 1820s 1830s 1840s 1850s Total 
Bank 87.5 63.3 82.0 43.1 42.9 34.7 46.9 52.8 
  (16) (30) (128) (58) (156) (49) (271) (708) 
Bridge 3.3 34.0 27.2 44.6 42.0 45.3 45.0 37.8 
  (30) (47) (81) (65) (119) (75) (80) (497) 
Canal 65.5 68.8 45.8 39.0 30.4 45.5 4.8 42.6 
  (29) (16) (24) (41) (23) (22) (21) (176) 
Insurance 61.5 46.9 26.1 17.0 20.0 48.4 47.8 37.8 
  (13) (32) (46) (53) (175) (155) (253) (727) 
Manufacturing 50.0 40.0 31.4 10.0 37.6 39.1 19.6 31.4 
  (2) (10) (70) (80) (335) (161) (148) (806) 
Mining N/A 0.00 14.3 9.1 71.7 53.1 25.0 48.4 
  (0) (3) (7) (22) (187) (98) (152) (469) 
Railroad N/A N/A 100.0 48.4 41.3 33.9 5.8 27.4 
  (0) (0) (1) (31) (322) (121) (276) (751) 
Road 3.0 45.5 66.8 71.2 67.7 67.5 72.1 65.3 
  (33) (231) (316) (146) (288) (268) (605) (1887) 
Utility 25.0 33.3 28.6 21.7 28.6 33.3 25.4 27.3 
  (4) (18) (14) (23) (42) (60) (205) (366) 
Total 35.4 45.5 56.6 41.0 46.1 48.9 42.6 45.9 
  (127) (387) (687) (519) (1647) (1009) (2011) (6387) 
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Table 2.  
logistic regression 
 
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Firms with Restricted Voting  
Omitted Variables: Manufacturing, Georgia, 1850s 
  Industry Coefficient   State Coefficient   Decade Coefficient 
  Bank 1.724*** CT -0.330 1790s 0.109 
 (0.134) (0.240) (0.228) 
  Bridge 0.351** DE -0.218 1800s 0.206 
 (0.148) (0.343) (0.136) 
  Canal 0.599*** MD -0.0637 1810s 0.504*** 
 (0.210) (0.223) (0.112) 
  Insurance 0.600*** NC 1.647*** 1820s 0.199 
 (0.133) (0.225) (0.124) 
  Mining 0.161 NH -0.400 1830s 0.213** 
 (0.155) (0.260) (0.0885) 
  Railroad -0.0641 NJ -0.101 1840s 0.210** 
 (0.137) (0.209) (0.0969) 
  Road 1.599*** NY 0.610*** Constant -2.322*** 
 (0.118) (0.198) (0.213) 
  Utility 0.0696 PA 1.796***
 (0.168) (0.192)
  RI 1.303***
  (0.219)
  VA 3.686***
    (0.219)
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Number of observations: 6,387 
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